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ABSTRACT 
The federal budget is a myth. Despite being a myth, Congress uses the 
budget to limit its choices by linking its revenue-raising and spending 
powers under a federal debt ceiling. Through its self-imposed limits, 
Congress puts tremendous pressure on how it calculates its budget, 
and that calculation generally assumes any tax provisions will raise 
revenue when the law becomes effective. However, many tax 
provisions require additional direction to ensure they operate as the 
budgetary process expects. That task falls to the Treasury Department 
and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as a bureau of the Department. 
Consequently, limiting the production of tax rules that implement, 
interpret, and sometimes limit possible interpretations of tax statutes 
is problematic because their projected revenue is used to balance the 
budget. Nevertheless, these Treasury Department rules are under 
attack on the grounds that their issuance fails to comply with the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA generally requires 
notice and comment for the promulgation of rules, a costly process in 
terms of time and agency resources. This Article argues that there 
should be a wider acceptance of the good cause exception for the 
speedier issuance of tax regulations and other IRS-level implementing 
materials in order to satisfy Congress’s revenue expectations. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 514 
I. TAX AS PART OF BUDGETING .................................................. 520 
A. Creating the Federal Budget ............................................ 520 
1. Enacting Tax Legislation as Part of the Budget ....... 521 
2. Estimates of Revenue Are a Necessary Evil .............. 528 
B. Problems if the Budget Fails ........................................... 532 
                                                   
 * Professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. I would like to 
thank many helpful comments from the faculties of Indiana University Maurer School 
of Law and the University of Houston Law Center for their thoughtful feedback on 
drafts of this paper and the Harold C. Schott Foundation for its financial support. 
514 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
II. CREATING THE MATERIALS THAT IMPLEMENT THE TAX  
 LAW .......................................................................................... 539 
A. Current Procedures ........................................................... 539 
1. Tax’s Procedures ....................................................... 539 
2. APA Procedures ........................................................ 544 
3. Types of Regulations .................................................. 547 
B. The Impact of These Agency-Created Materials ............. 550 
1. Guidance for Taxpayers and IRS Agents ................... 550 
2. Penalties When Taxpayers Fail to Follow Them ...... 554 
C. Recent Judicial Challenges to Tax Materials ................... 557 
1. Judicial Review of Notice and Comment in Tax  
 Cases .......................................................................... 557 
2. Temporary Regulations and Timing .......................... 561 
III. USE OF GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION ............................................ 566 
A. General Exception from Notice and Comment ................ 566 
B. Use of the Good Cause Exception in Tax ........................ 575 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 584 
 
INTRODUCTION 
With the passage of a multi-hundred-page Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
of 2017,1 which changes tax rates, entitlement to deductions and 
credits, and many operating rules of the Internal Revenue Code 
(Code), the Treasury Department and the IRS, as a bureau of the 
Department, must create guidance to implement the new law before 
taxpayers can file their tax returns. Because not all taxpayers are 
calendar-year taxpayers, the time to create this guidance may be less 
than a calendar year. These changes not only extended tax breaks to 
taxpayers, which might justify expecting taxpayers to pay a tax 
advisor to understand the new law, but some changes increased 
taxpayers’ burden. That increase was necessary to control the cost of 
the new legislation.2 
Cost is important because any annual deficit when Congress fails 
to balance the budget adds to the national debt as Congress borrows to 
fund its excess spending.3 As of May 31, 2017, the U.S. government’s 
publicly held debt had reached almost $15 trillion or about 75% of the 
                                                   
 1. See generally Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 2. See S. Con. Res. 25, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 3. The U.S. has only run budget surpluses in four of the past forty years. 
Nevertheless, the country has had several periods when the national debt as a 
percentage of GDP was reduced because of growth in the economy. Office of Mgmt. 
& Budget, Historical Tables, WHITE HOUSE (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/historical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/FK88-FYQP] (Tables 1.1 and 1.7). 
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nation’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).4 According to the 
CIA’s World Factbook, this ratio ranks the U.S. as the 34th most debt-
loaded country in the world.5 This amount excludes the $5.5 trillion 
intragovernmental debt (such as that held by the Social Security Trust 
Fund) and the quickly growing $5.8 trillion state and local debt.6 
Combined, the total federal debt in 2017 (still excluding state and local 
debt) was $20.5 trillion or over 104% of GDP.7  
Congress has chosen to bind itself to reducing the size of national 
deficits and, consequently, reducing growth in the federal debt. 
Although these limits are not constitutional, they affect congressional 
decision-making and the public’s perception of those decisions.8 
“[T]he cost of a proposal is critical, and the revenue estimate of the 
cost is necessary for every proposal at the front end of the 
consideration of that proposal.”9 Current law generally requires that 
the fiscal system balance over a ten-year projection period even 
though Congress is allowed to, and does, override this restriction.10 In 
other words, Congress generally looks at, and is many times limited 
by, the effects of projected taxing and spending over ten years as it 
decides current tax policy. 
Although the determination of the deficit is based on estimates 
of revenue and spending that can only be verified after year-end, 
Congress creates tax provisions with an expectation that they will 
                                                   
 4. For a breakdown of the federal debt, see Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
Federal Debt: Total Public Debt, ECON. RES., 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEBTN [https://perma.cc/46WX-K24C] (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
 5. CIA, Country Comparison: Public Debt, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186rank. 
html [https://perma.cc/NKN4-S4C9] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). Foreign investors 
hold approximately 30% of public debt, although estimates of who holds debt and 
how much they hold is hard to verify because investors often hold securities through 
intermediaries. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Fiscal Service, Federal Debt Held by 
Foreign and International Investors, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FDHBFIN [https://perma.cc/6MRA-V39R] (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
 6. Intragovernmental Holdings and Debt Held by the Public, TREASURY 
DIRECT, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/charts/principal/principal_govpub.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8HFR-JUPU] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
 7. For a breakdown of the federal debt, see Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
supra note 4. 
 8. See infra Part I for more on the budget process. 
 9. Bernard M. (Bob) Shapiro, The Last 50 Years: The Evolving Role of the 
Joint Committee Staff in the Tax Legislative Process, U.S. CAPITOL HIST. SOC. (2016), 
https://uschs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/USCHS-History-Role-Joint-
Committee-Taxation-Shapiro.pdf [https://perma.cc/DDX2-E5HS]. 
 10. See 2 U.S.C. § 632 (2012). The joint budget resolution sets the budget 
window. See id. 
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operate immediately upon their designated effective dates to raise 
revenue.11 Revenue shortfalls, either because of errors in congressional 
assumptions or because provisions prove hard to enforce, upset the 
already precarious balance of the government’s budget. In some 
instances, despite budgetary projections, the law requires additional 
action. For some tax provisions, Congress explicitly, and other times 
implicitly, demands the Treasury Department adopt regulations to 
implement the law.12 Thus, when Congress leaves the law to be 
“determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary” of the 
Treasury Department, additional rules are expected.13 For example, the 
new § 199A, permitting taxpayers to take a deduction for certain 
business investments, has four such references.14  
To the end of making tax law operational, the Treasury 
Department issues rules that operationalize new revenue-raising laws 
because, although the law may apply on its face, taxpayers may 
interpret ambiguity in their own favor.15 Thus, although Congress 
makes the decision as to what should be taxed and at what rate, the 
Treasury Department often makes the system work. Its rules facilitate 
tax planning, tax filing, and the review of taxpayer activities by 
auditors. To the extent that this guidance has the force of law, it has a 
substantial effect on taxpayers’ obligations, but its timing is also 
critical for the system to raise the revenue Congress expects.  
Because the federal budget assumes that tax provisions generate 
revenue immediately, the Treasury Department is under pressure to 
issue guidance quickly. However, the Treasury Department has a 
limited budget, and its speedier procedures for creating rules are 
subject to debate. Many contemporary attacks on the Treasury 
Department’s process for issuing tax guidance claim that the process 
fails to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).16 The 
                                                   
 11. See infra Section I.A for more on estimates. 
 12. Ellen P. Aprill, The Impact of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review 
on Tax Reform, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 917, 917 (2012) (foretelling the need for the IRS to 
be able to quickly issue guidance). 
 13. E.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub L. No. 115-97, § 11011, 131 
Stat. 2054, 2068 (2017) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 199A). 
 14. See id. § 11011, 131 Stat. at 2065, 2068, 2069, 2070. 
 15. See 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b) (2012). 
 16. See Ellen Aprill, supra note 12; Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the 
Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 466 (2013); Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-
Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. 89, 
92-93 (2010); Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s 
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1178-86 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for 
Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 
1543 (2006); Steven R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the 
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APA requires agencies that create rules to follow a procedure, 
popularly referred to as notice and comment, unless the rules are 
specifically carved out.17 This means agencies must provide the public 
with notice of proposed rules and consider the public’s comments after 
a reasonable comment period.  
Courts are currently deciding how rigorously to apply notice and 
comment to tax guidance. A recent judicial trend, although a relatively 
short one, has been to strike down tax guidance as inadequate.18 Courts 
are increasingly interpreting the Treasury Department’s policies as 
insufficient as a matter of law. These decisions have been rendered 
without considering Congress’s often unstated demand for 
implementing rules’ speedy issuance. 
These decisions come at a time when the president actively 
discourages the production of tax regulations.19 A President Trump 
Executive Order demands agencies eliminate two rules every time 
they create a new one.20 In the world of a complex tax statute, this 
raises the political cost of creating guidance that interprets the law. On 
the other hand, the Tax Court has sided with the taxpayer “for mistakes 
of law in a complicated subject area that lacks clear guidance.”21 Thus, 
the need for guidance grows even as the government may be reluctant 
to produce it.22 
In this political and judicial environment, the threat that tax 
regulations may be judicially invalidated on procedural grounds will 
likely significantly impact the federal deficit and the federal debt. 
Regulations may be overturned, and the Treasury Department may 
delay issuing rules because of fear of invalidation. In either event, in 
                                                   
Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 280 (2012); Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over 
‘Fighting Regs’ and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 649-
50 (2012); Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal 
Tax Regulators, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 775 (1987); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax 
Abuse According to Whom?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 52 (2013); Kristin E. Hickman, 
Goodbye Tax Exceptionalism, 12 ENGAGE 6 (2011), http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/goodbye-tax-exceptionalism 
 [https://perma.cc/YGP7-9V77]. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
 17. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 18. See infra Section I.C. 
 19. See Second Report to the President on Identifying and Reducing Tax 
Regulatory Burdens, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,013, 48,014 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 301).  
 20. See Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 
9,339, 9.339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 21. Simonsen v. Comm’r, No. 29698–14, 2018 WL 1320362, at *10 (T.C. 
Mar. 14, 2018). 
 22. See Second Report to the President on Identifying and Reducing Tax 
Regulatory Burdens, 82 Fed. Reg. at 40,014. 
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many instances the law as enacted will not produce the revenue it is 
estimated to produce. This puts pressure on the federal budget, which 
assumes the implementation of the law. 
To improve the revenue-raising side of the budget, this Article 
argues that there is good cause to except most, if not all, tax rules from 
the notice-and-comment procedure.23 Although Congress rarely 
explicitly enacts deadlines for when tax regulations must be issued, 
Congress builds into tax legislation an expectation that the system will 
affect taxpayers immediately, often demanding many detailed and 
complex regulations. The compounding effect of numerous new tax 
statutes and changes to existing tax provisions renders impossible 
strict compliance with the APA while maintaining a workable 
revenue-raising regime as envisioned by Congress. Even though 
budgeting assumptions are fallible, the Treasury Department should 
operationalize the law that is enacted, enabling policymakers to make 
budget choices better understanding the consequences of those 
choices.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, this Article 
examines the budgeting process and how Congress fits tax provisions 
into its budget. Regulations and other tax guidance materials help 
make the tax system operational and, as such, play an integral part in 
the congressional budgetary plan.24 As shown in the estimates used in 
the budget process to reconcile spending with revenue, Congress 
generally expects tax statutes to raise revenue as it spends that money 
in the same legislative cycle. Failure of the tax system to fulfill its 
budgetary role can result in negative effects, such as automatic 
reduction in spending.25 
Part II examines the Treasury Department’s process for 
promulgating regulations. Additionally, Part II analyzes the financial 
penalties taxpayers face if they fail to follow tax regulations. Currently 
these penalties apply even if regulations have not gone through notice 
and comment.26 These issues have been the subject of many recent 
cases discussed in Part II.27 In particular, this Part examines the tension 
with the APA created by temporary tax regulations. 
Part III analyzes the APA’s good cause exception from notice 
and comment as well as a good cause exception from the thirty-day 
waiting period for regulations to become effective following 
                                                   
 23. But see Jonathan Olsen, Note, The Unique Case of Treasury Regulations 
Issued to Prevent Abuse, 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 174, 179-80 (2013). 
 24. See infra Section I.A. 
 25. See infra Section I.B. 
 26. See infra Subsection II.B.2. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
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publication.28 Although the good cause exception is generally 
interpreted narrowly, it has a role to play when agencies need to enact 
revenue-raising rules.29 This reliance on exceptions from notice and 
comment is not unusual. All federal agencies, not merely the Treasury 
Department, are increasingly relying on exceptions in order to issue 
regulations to the public because of the costs of notice and comment.30  
The Article concludes that thwarting Congress’s expectations by 
delaying the issuance of regulations threatens the nation’s ability to 
raise revenue to pay its bills. That need provides good cause for the 
prompt issuance of regulations, which may already be delayed by the 
political process. Because regulations help ensure statutes reflect 
Congress’s expected cost of activities, limiting regulations risks 
sending the wrong signals to taxpayers as they plan their activities and 
to IRS personnel when they audit those activities. Therefore, courts 
should accept the Treasury Department’s claim of good cause for the 
issuance of tax regulations, particularly when the regulations 
implement revenue-raising provisions.31 
The approach advocated in this Article is consistent with the 
current jurisprudence on the good cause exception. Nevertheless, this 
use of the exception is likely to be seen as broadening current 
jurisprudence. Ideally, Congress could legislate a tax-specific 
exception to notice and comment to nullify the debate. This would not 
be unprecedented as Congress has legislated an exemption for tax 
from most pre-enforcement litigation.32 However, in the current 
political environment, it is unlikely that Congress will do so. Without 
                                                   
 28. See infra Part III; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3), (d) (2012); Riverbend 
Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1992) (analyzing the 
differences between the good cause exception to the thirty-day waiting requirement 
and the good cause exception to notice and comment). 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See id. The Government Accountability Office found approximately 35% 
of major rules and 44% of nonmajor rules were issued without notice and comment 
between 2003 and 2010. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-21, FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC 
COMMENTS (2012); see also Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 
MO. L. REV. 695, 695 (2007); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1123 (2009). 
 31. If Congress changes its budgeting process not to expect current 
application of tax statutes, this argument would no longer hold true. 
 32. The Anti-Injunction Act, now in § 7421 of the Code, denies injunctive 
relief by generally prohibiting “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not 
such person is the person against whom such taxes was assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) 
(2012). The Declaratory Judgment Act contains a broader tax exception that prevents 
courts from providing declaratory relief for controversies “with respect to Federal 
taxes.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
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that action, this proposal provides the second-best approach: a strong 
litigation strategy justifying the prompt issuance of tax rules 
implementing congressionally crafted laws as a much-needed 
backstop for the American budget in the face of complicated 
congressional politics. 
I. TAX AS PART OF BUDGETING 
Every year the federal government enacts many tax provisions 
of varying sizes and political import. For example, between 1986 and 
2005, Congress enacted almost 15,000 changes to the Code or more 
than two per day.33 Some of these changes were part of major pieces 
of legislation. Others were technical revisions correcting prior 
typographical errors.34 All enacted legislation follows a similar path 
but with different amounts of congressional and popular attention. 
Demand for a balanced budget drives many of the bigger changes, and 
a lack of deficit may even be required in the budgeting process.35 
Therefore, the revenue impact of tax law changes is often critical to 
their form and justification. 
A. Creating the Federal Budget 
The enactment of tax legislation requires a complex interplay 
between the executive and legislative branches of government because 
tax legislation is part of the federal budget process.36 However, that 
interplay usually focuses on the federal budget generally, rather than 
on tax alone.37 Even when tax legislation is considered in isolation, 
particular revenue effects drive the process: revenue neutrality, the 
need to raise revenue, or the need to grant a certain amount of tax 
reduction.38 Therefore, tax legislation is often seen as a tool for raising 
a given amount of money and, even when also viewed as a means to 
                                                   
 33. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, 
AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM (2005). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See 31 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012). 
 36. The federal government’s fiscal year begins on October 1. See 31 U.S.C. 
§ 1102 (2012). 
 37. Existing budgeting procedures recognize policymakers’ inability to 
simultaneously compare all factors affecting the economy and society. See Elizabeth 
Garrett, Rethinking the Structure of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 397 (1998). However, other processes might be no simpler. 
See id. at 444-45. 
 38. See id. at 398. 
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accomplish social or fiscal objectives, the estimated revenue impact is 
critical to congressional and presidential approval.39 
1. Enacting Tax Legislation as Part of the Budget 
Although the president often starts the dialogue over tax 
legislation with a proposed budget, the Constitution requires that all 
tax legislation originate in the House of Representatives and be 
approved by both houses of Congress.40 As between the branches of 
government and within Congress, political compromise over tax 
legislation is often difficult. Rarely does either political party have 
control over both houses of Congress and the presidency and, even 
when one does, the party may not be cohesive.41 Nevertheless, tax 
legislation is often required in order to satisfy requirements of the 
national budget that is required by federal law for each fiscal year.42 
The creation of a budget, of which tax revenue is one part, is long and 
labor intensive. Budget volumes reach eight to twelve feet high when 
printed.43 Within this process, Congress often finds it easier to spend 
money than to raise it, with the result that Congress has tied its hands 
procedurally to increase the likelihood that sufficient tax revenue is 
raised to fund its spending. 
The Budget Control Act of 1974 requires that the House of 
Representatives and Senate pass resolutions that contain budget 
targets for the budget window period, currently ten years.44 Congress 
passed the Budget Control Act to respond to the president’s greater 
influence as the instigator of budgets.45 These congressional 
resolutions are to permit Congress to recapture the process by 
coordinating its budget-related legislation.46 However, although 
                                                   
 39. See id. at 409. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Pursuant to federal law, the president must submit 
a budget to Congress before the first Monday of each February. See 31 U.S.C. § 
1105(a) (2012). 
 41. Negotiating budgets has grown more contentious. See Joseph Bafumi, 
The Senate Budget Committee: The Impact of Polarization on Institutional Design, 34 
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 161, 166 (2012). 
 42. See 31 U.S. § 1105(a). 
 43. DANIEL BERMAN & VICTORIA HANEMAN, MAKING TAX LAW 7 (2014). 
 44. See 2 U.S.C. § 632 (2012). The budget resolution must cover at least five 
fiscal years but has covered up to eleven years. Id. 
 45. See id. § 621. 
 46. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS: POLITICS, POLICY, 
PROCESS 119-20 (2007). Congress can change the procedures of the budget resolution 
by majority vote, reducing any stability in the budgeting process when it relies on 
these resolutions. House rules are readopted every year and can be changed by a 
simple majority; in the Senate, rules continue until amended and are subject to a 
filibuster except, perhaps oddly, budget-related rules through the budget resolution. 
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budget resolutions cannot be filibustered, they are generally only 
passed if one party has a 50% majority in both houses. If passed, these 
resolutions have no legal effect but are a framework for deciding 
revenue, spending, and other financial decisions.47  
Budget resolutions often demand a certain amount of revenue be 
“saved” by designated committees.48 Within the House, primary 
responsibility for tax legislation has been delegated to the House 
Committee on Ways and Means.49 Once the House agrees on a draft 
bill, the bill goes to the Senate for the Senate’s consideration. The 
Senate’s committee comparable to Ways and Means is the Senate 
Committee on Finance.50 Under a budget resolution, these committees 
are to report the amount they reduce spending, but the rules of regular 
budget resolutions do not force compliance by the committees, and 
committees are free to determine how the savings will be 
accomplished.51 Notwithstanding these demands, few of the savings 
sought by budget resolutions are ever enacted.52 
Thus, although in the strongest sense budget committees direct 
how much revenue tax committees should raise, the substance of tax 
legislation remains framed by the Ways and Means and Finance 
Committees.53 Unlike with other legislation, tax committees and the 
                                                   
See Adopting Rules for the One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, H.R. Res. 5, 115th 
Cong. (2017); Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 47. Adjustments to increase revenue are generally made through the tax code; 
changes to spending are generally for other committees but focus on mandatory, as 
opposed to discretionary, spending. See Molly Reynolds, Picking the Pivot: Use and 
Consequence of the Budget Reconciliation Procedures in the United States Senate, 
ASPA 2013 ANN. MEETING PAPER 7 (2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300328 
[https://perma.cc/36TL-UPQN]. 
 48. See H.R. Comm. Jurisdiction—Ways and Means, 
 https://waysandmeans.house.gov/committee-jurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc?6S5B-
SPZY] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
 49. See id. (indicating that drafting varies depending upon the issue); see also 
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575-76 (2002) (following 
interviews of staff of the Judicial Committee). 
 50. See S. Comm. on Fin., Jurisdiction, SENATE.GOV, 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/about/jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/XND2-3A72] 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2018).  
 51. See ALLEN SCHICK, RECONCILIATION AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
PROCESS 6 (1981). 
 52. See id. 
 53. However, tax expenditures, or subsidies delivered through the tax system 
rather than as direct spending, are not directly included in the budget and totaled more 
than $1.2 trillion in 2016, or more than all discretionary spending that year. See JOINT 
COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 
2016-2020, JCX-3-17 (2017). 
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full houses of Congress do not always use proposed statutory language 
as the basis of their discussion of tax bills.54 Instead of statutory 
language, debate over most tax legislation proceeds from narrative 
descriptions that focus on the concepts. These descriptions of 
legislative proposals are written by the Joint Committee on Taxation 
(JCT).55 The staff of the JCT, acting in the same way as outside 
attorneys to a client, translate technical jargon and legal concepts to 
the lay members of Congress, who vote based on these descriptions.56 
These JCT-produced conceptual descriptions might be the best 
method for assuring that members of Congress understand the content 
of the legislation before they vote.57 Nevertheless, the bill’s final 
language may be intentionally ambiguous or unintentionally vague 
because of a lack of sufficient time to clarify the language.58 
This committee-powered approach has weakened in recent years 
with the rise of political partisanship.59 Today, political parties are 
more ideological and cohesive than in prior decades, giving their 
leaders tremendous power.60 As party leaders gained power over the 
shape of legislation, the House’s Ways and Means Committee’s role 
declined.61 This has resulted in new members working in the 
committee and it having less influence over tax legislation in the full 
House.62 This is also evidenced by the committee’s limited role in 
developing recent tax legislation.63 
The power of the tax committees also responds to other political 
constraints. The House Committee on Rules has tremendous power 
over the fate of tax legislation because it sets the parameters of debate 
                                                   
 54. See BERMAN & HANEMAN, supra note 43, at 264; JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 
ABOUT THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION 5-7, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1174 
[https://perma.cc/4GTR-KA7D] (last visited Oct 8, 2018). 
 55. See George K. Yin, The Role of Nonpartisan Staff in the Legislative 
Process, 139 TAX NOTES 1415, 1417-19 (2013); Shapiro, supra note 9. 
 56. See Shapiro, supra note 9. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, supra note 49, at 594-97. 
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in the full House.64 The Rules Committee can either set a closed rule, 
so the bill must be accepted or rejected in its entirety, or a modified 
closed rule, permitting specific amendments and limiting the hours of 
debate.65 Therefore, the Rules Committee determines whether 
Representatives can delay a vote in the House.66 For example, in the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the House’s Rules Committee limited 
debate to four hours, divided equally between the parties with all 
points of order or intervening motions waived.67 
When the Senate’s Finance Committee considers tax legislation, 
it has less support from its Rules Committee because the Senate’s 
Rules Committee is not as powerful as its House counterpart.68 A vote 
for cloture is normally required to end debate and call a measure to 
vote in the Senate, which can end a filibuster.69 Cloture requires a 
three-fifths vote of the Senate (or sixty Senators) and, if passed, 
cloture allows for thirty hours of additional debate followed by a vote 
on the bill.70  
Because of political disagreements and without a strong Rules 
Committee in the Senate, tax legislation risks filibuster in that house, 
in which a group of Senators can talk on the floor of Congress to delay 
or defer a vote on legislation.71 Because neither political party may 
have sufficient votes for cloture, Congress created a mechanism to get 
budget legislation to a vote, called the reconciliation process, in the 
Budget Control Act of 1974.72 In addition to the regular budget 
resolution, reconciliation requires that the House and Senate agree on 
a budget resolution that includes “reconciliation directives” for 
specific committees.73 This also means that reconciliation is only 
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possible if a budget resolution can be passed because of sufficient 
control over both houses of Congress. 
The reconciliation process eliminates the risk of a filibuster 
because it frames committees’ agendas, reduces the necessary vote for 
passing a bill to 50% of the Senate, and limits debate to twenty hours 
in the Senate and to ten hours for conference compromises.74 Although 
similar rules apply in the House of Representatives, its Rules 
Committee often imposes even more limiting restrictions.75 Therefore, 
reconciliation helps ensure budgeting legislation makes it out of the 
Senate quickly and without a super-majority vote. 
Reconciliation requires the committees designated in the budget 
resolution to prepare and report legislation by a certain date.76 In the 
first year reconciliation was used, 1980, twenty committees 
participated and, in 1981, thirty committees did.77 Committees are told 
to either (1) increase or decrease spending, (2) increase or decrease 
revenue, or (3) raise or lower the public debt limit.78 This language 
limiting actions to three groups of activities has been interpreted to 
mean that there can only be three bills per budget resolution, and if a 
bill covers more than one subject the number of permissible bills is 
reduced.79 Additionally, reconciliation is not to be used to change the 
law in ways that do not affect the budget unless the change is necessary 
for a budget-altering provision.80 
With the concurrent resolution calling for reconciliation, the 
Committee on the Budget (which includes, among others, members of 
the Committees on Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules) 
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reconciliation). 
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establishes the aggregate amount of revenue to be raised as part of the 
reconciliation process.81 The Ways and Means Committee must raise 
at least that much tax revenue. The tax committees are able to structure 
the tax laws to raise that revenue as they like—subject only to getting 
the final provisions through the full houses and signed by the 
president.82 By setting the target, however, the reconciliation process 
limits the tax committees’ freedom to enact or revise tax legislation if 
proposals are not within their respective committees’ revenue 
targets.83 It also means that members of Congress may be less 
concerned about the specifics of proposals than their cumulative 
effects.84 
The reconciliation process has proven popular. After first being 
used in 1980, twenty reconciliation bills were enacted before 2016.85 
Four others were approved by Congress but vetoed by the president.86 
Despite its popularity, the process has been critiqued for preventing 
fundamental reform by producing fragile and narrow legislative 
changes rather than well-thought-out substantive change.87  
This process is also powerful. Although reconciliation was 
created at a time when the focus was on deficits, by 1996, Republicans 
argued that it could be used to increase the deficit.88 Over its life, 
reconciliation has been used to decrease and increase deficits—the 
former is illustrated with the Reagan budget in 1980 and the latter with 
the Bush tax cuts.89 In 2007, Congress adopted rules to prohibit its use 
to increase deficits, but the limit was eliminated in the House in 2011 
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and in the Senate in 2016.90 Reconciliation was again used to increase 
deficits with the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.91 
However, even when reconciliation does not prevent a deficit, it 
limits the size of the deficit. For example, in 2017, the Senate Budget 
Committee Chairman called for the Finance Committee to produce a 
revenue bill that would “increase the deficit by no more than $1.5 
trillion” over ten years.92 Thus, tax cuts were the call for the day, but 
they were not to be unlimited. Even when Congress feels free to spend 
revenue, in the budgeting process Congress recognizes that this 
spending power is not unlimited. 
The Senate supplemented reconciliation with the Byrd Rule, 
codified in 1985.93 The Byrd Rule establishes a point of order, or 
parliamentary objection, against Senators amending a reconciliation 
bill with unrelated provisions, including any amendment to the bill 
that does not involve revenue matters or that decreases federal revenue 
after the ten-year period begun by the concurrent resolution starting 
the reconciliation process.94 A successful point of order strikes the 
extraneous provision but retains the rest of the bill.95 For example, in 
2017 the Senate parliamentarian blocked repeal of the Johnson 
amendment that would have allowed 501(c)(3)’s, including churches, 
to endorse candidates as not having a budgetary impact.96 A 
supermajority vote of Senators is required to retain the offending 
provision.97 The Byrd Rule applies only in the Senate, but the House’s 
Rules Committee can set equivalent rules in its discretion. 
This Article is not in support of the use of budget resolutions or 
the reconciliation process; that discussion is beyond the scope of this 
work. Regardless of its value, the fate of much tax legislation hangs 
on the Byrd Rule’s limit on amendments and the permissive majority 
vote of reconciliation. Without these rules, much tax legislation would 
fail. For example, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 would not have 
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passed if a supermajority were required.98 Tax policy is, therefore, 
greatly impacted by the budgeting process and its dependence upon 
raising revenue or framing tax cuts. 
A side effect is that, although the Ways and Means and Finance 
Committees are delegated the responsibility for drafting tax 
legislation, they do not have free reign to do so. Even when cutting 
taxes, the process for creating new tax legislation is bound by 
structural limits to contain the size of the federal budget deficit. These 
processes link taxing and spending and force tax legislation that raises 
targeted amounts of revenue. To a real extent, Congress depends upon 
descriptions of tax legislation in their debates over proposed changes 
and of those changes’ revenue effects to decide on the best choice of 
tax legislation. 
2. Estimates of Revenue Are a Necessary Evil 
The budgeting process depends upon estimates of revenue and 
spending. These estimates of how much money Congress spends and 
how much revenue it raises under current law and with proposed tax 
changes dictate whether the budget is considered to be balanced.99 
These estimates are necessarily imprecise because the real-world 
results depend upon the public’s responses to the law and to other 
variables; thus, flawed sources are a cornerstone of Congress’s 
decision-making process.100 Even if the estimated revenue effects 
prove inaccurate, Congress uses them to choose among many different 
programs and tax possibilities.101 “Those estimates often play a critical 
role in congressional deliberations and public discussion.”102 If the 
estimates were known to be incorrect at the time, it might change the 
law Congress enacts. 
The difficult task of estimating the revenue effects of current and 
proposed legislation is delegated to the JCT or the Congressional 
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Budget Office (CBO). The JCT is the older organization, formed in 
1926, and is the principal adviser to congressional tax-writing 
committees.103 The JCT’s power has diminished in recent decades 
because of the proliferation of other sources of information, namely 
committee staffs and lobbyists.104 The CBO was created in 1974 by the 
same Budget Control Act that created the budget resolution and 
reconciliation processes.105 The CBO serves congressional budget 
committees rather than tax committees.106  Focusing on the budget, the 
CBO analyzes overall spending and revenue rather than the specific 
tax provisions the JCT analyzes. These committees’ reputations are as 
relatively objective and nonpartisan institutions that try to predict how 
much revenue will be raised or lost and from which group of taxpayers 
will the money come or go. 
Upon request from members of Congress of both political parties 
and in both houses, these two organizations create tables that provide 
a revenue number for each proposal.107 That revenue number is 
coupled with information regarding the revenue and distributional 
consequences of legislative proposals. Despite the effort put in the 
creation of these estimates, no estimate is perfect and no method 
infallible. These advisors cannot precisely predict the effects of 
policies on the distribution of income and wealth. Nevertheless, 
despite their imperfections, these estimates are scientific, and the 
specialists who create budget estimates are highly trained in taxation 
and economics.  
To begin the estimation process, the CBO and JCT create a 
baseline of forecasted expenditures and revenue based on current 
policy as they define it and, against that baseline, the agencies score 
proposed changes.108 Therefore, scoring is what determines the cost 
and benefit of proposals, but that scoring depends upon the baseline, 
so it is important that old estimates be accurate. Baselines are 
generally not updated, opening estimates to critique, but the resulting 
consistency arguably permits a better comparison of numbers over 
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time.109 For purposes of proposed tax changes required by budget 
resolutions, the CBO provides the baseline, and the JCT completes the 
scoring.110 Most legislation is scored for the ten-year budget period.111 
Thus, the federal budget is measured over ten years, and not on an 
annual basis, in recognition of the ebbs and flows of the economy.  
Not everything is scored using the same process. Proposed tax 
expenditures, taken as part of the baseline once enacted, are scored 
based on a five-year window by the JCT in conjunction with the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Analysis (OTA).112 Although 
required as part of the budget process, the Tax Expenditure Budget of 
existing tax expenditures is informational and is not a constraint on 
congressional spending.113 Therefore, funding for tax expenditures 
continues indefinitely until Congress modifies or repeals the 
provision. 
To create estimates incorporating potential changes in taxpayer 
behavior, agencies create economic models based on assumptions 
about how people respond to changes in their personal economic 
situations, and those assumptions can be challenged and revised.114 
Both the CBO and JCT have a range of predicted behavioral responses 
that they determine based on formal statistical analyses and anecdotal 
evidence.115 Starting in 2003, the process incorporated macroeconomic 
data and, as of 2015, requires dynamic scoring in certain 
circumstances.116  
                                                   
 109. See generally David Kamin & Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax Laws and 
the Budget Baseline, 157 TAX NOTES 125 (2017); Jared Shirck & Francis Shen, The 
Role of Estimation in Budget Procedures: Baseline (2005), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/Baselines_4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TA5J-JTVP] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).  
 110. See Alan Auerbach, Dynamic Scoring: An Introduction to the Issues, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 421, 421 (May 4, 2005). For tax and spending bills the committees 
work together to create estimates. See Elmendorf, supra note 101, at 94.  
 111. This time frame can change. In 1981, when reconciliation was first used, 
the window was three fiscal years, extended to five years in 1990, and then to ten 
years in 2002. See Dylan Moroses & Stephen Cooper, Questions Raised on Budget 
Window Extension for Tax Reform, 155 TAX NOTES 893, 893 (2017). 
 112. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 53, at 1. 
 113. See id. at 22. 
 114. See Elmendorf, supra note 101, at 98. 
 115. See id. at 95.  
 116. See S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong. (2015); H. Res. 5, 108th Cong. (2003); 
Elmendorf, supra note 101, at 92. For more on dynamic scoring, see DOUGLAS HOLTZ-
EAKIN & MICHAEL MANDEL, DYNAMIC SCORING AND INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING 4 
(2015); Paul Van de Water & Chye-Ching Huang, Budget and Tax Plans Should Not 
Rely on “Dynamic Scoring,” CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1, 4 (2014); see 
also Auerbach, supra note 110, at 421. 
 Tax as Part of a Broken Budget 531 
Today, the CBO and JCT use dynamic scoring as an economic 
forecasting model that evaluates the impact a proposal would have on 
the aggregate economy, including secondary positive or negative 
effects.117 These effects include such things as increases in labor 
supply or investment. Before dynamic scoring, only the immediate 
effects of tax cuts, tax hikes, or tax benefits were considered. Dynamic 
scoring is hoped to present a more complete estimation of a bill’s 
effects; however, one proponent of dynamic scoring warned of the 
difficulty of preparing this type of estimate: “[e]ven if using rules of 
thumb to estimate macroeconomic effects could improve the accuracy 
of budget estimates on average, doing so would endanger the 
credibility of the estimating process.”118  
The executive branch has its own creators of budget estimates: 
the OTA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).119 The 
OTA is the executive branch’s counterpart to the JCT, and it houses 
economists and legal advisors to the Secretary of the Treasury who 
handle most of the executive branch’s tax and tax-related planning.120 
The OMB is the executive branch’s counterpart to the CBO, but it 
rarely deals directly with tax matters.121 
Notwithstanding agencies’ best efforts, they are notorious for 
not interpreting proposals’ effects in similar ways. For example, the 
JCT expected President George Bush’s proposed reduction of capital 
gain rates to lose $11.4 billion in federal revenue over five years, but 
the OTA expected it to increase revenue by $12.5 billion.122 These two 
very different predictions resulted from different assumptions 
regarding how people would respond to changed rates.123 Because of 
the human factor in the economy, there is some amount of subjectivity 
in agencies’ analysis. Nonetheless, the validity of these estimates is 
critical to the budget process.124 
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Some inaccuracies cannot be mitigated because they result from 
later changes in the law. For example, in January 2001, the CBO 
projected a $5.6 trillion budget surplus between 2002 and 2011 that 
turned into a $6.1 trillion deficit. However, 25% of the swing was the 
result of enacted tax reductions, 35% was increased spending, and an 
estimated 38% was an undefined “economic and technical” change 
that served as a catchall for things non-legislative.125 Thus, changing 
law and changing conditions impact the estimates’ accuracy. 
With estimates complexity and inherent fallibility, members of 
Congress may not fully understand the assumptions upon which 
estimates are based or their limits.126 Professor Michael Graetz 
complains that policymakers frequently do not understand the 
differences between various estimates or what information each one 
lacks.127 The differences are fundamental, starting from different 
baselines and with different economic premises, including different 
predicted reactions. For example, baselines may, or may not, assume 
that expiring tax provisions will be extended and may develop 
different definitions of income.128 Similarly, tables may include people 
who are not tax return filers or be limited to people who pay income 
tax.129  
Regardless of Congress’s full comprehension of these estimates, 
estimates are the basis of tax legislation and are critical to the 
budgetary process. Congress makes choices based on this imperfect 
source. In particular, tax provisions are enacted with an expectation 
that they will raise a certain amount of money and spending is then 
tied to those revenue estimates. These estimates are the backbone of a 
budgeting system that creates targets for revenue and expenditures.  
B. Problems if the Budget Fails 
Under today’s budgeting procedures, Congress does not have to 
balance the budget as there is no federal constitutional requirement for 
a balanced budget. Nevertheless, Congress sets targets for how large 
the deficit will be. Rhetorically, deficits are hard to sell to an American 
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pubic that consistently calls for deficit reduction.130 Economically, 
deficits must be funded with borrowing, and the cost in diverted 
investments and interest payments takes a toll on the nation’s 
economic health.131 Thus, political demands and the debt limit are the 
primary constraints on unlimited spending or tax cuts.  
Congress has tried other means to bind itself to a more-or-less 
balanced budget. Congress has enacted federal legislation and rules in 
each house requiring balanced budgets, but all requirements permit 
exceptions with a sufficiently large majority vote.132 In the end, only 
the need to finance the deficit ensures Congress controls its own 
excesses. The structural and political need to balance the budget is 
counterbalanced by the political difficulty of doing so.133 
Although budget resolutions were introduced in 1974, it was not 
until 1985 that Congress tried to force itself to balance the budget.134 
With the passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 
Congress imposed punishments for failing to reduce deficits.135 Under 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, if deficit targets were not met, automatic 
across-the-board spending cuts took effect.136 This sequestration of 
funds proved unpopular and resulted in more gimmicks than deficit 
reduction.  
Congress changed its approach in 1990 with the Budget 
Enforcement Act in which Congress set caps on spending and 
implemented a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) backstop that demanded any 
increase in spending be currently offset with increases in revenue or 
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spending reductions.137 Although no penalties applied for failure to 
comply, sequestration was ordered if costs were not fully offset.138 The 
Budget Enforcement Act was extended several times and made 
permanent in 2010.139 However, PAYGO has limited power. PAYGO 
does not apply to discretionary spending, which is controlled by 
appropriations in the annual budget resolution.140 Additionally, the 
automatic across-the-board cut in selected mandatory programs is 
very narrow as many programs are carved out of this process.141  
The budget rules and PAYGO are statutory, not constitutional, 
requirements that have been allowed to lapse and can always be 
statutorily altered.142 For example, Congress was able to avoid 
sequestration in the early 2000s, despite deficit spending, by requiring 
the OMB to reset the PAYGO scorecard.143 By setting it to $0, instead 
of carrying forward balances largely attributable to the 2001 capital 
gain tax cuts, Congress permitted spending it would otherwise have 
been unable to undertake under its own rules. 
PAYGO did not permit deficit spending and neither does 
subsequent legislation, although Congress often skirts their 
limitations. The Budget Control Act of 2011, followed by the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, instituted a “super committee” to plan 
deficit reduction; however, the committee failed to put forward 
legislation.144 Nevertheless, these attempts to make the budget revenue 
neutral generally required that the estimated budget effects of any new 
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 139. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 931 (2012); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. 
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 141. See id. at 3. 
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Budget Magic, 6 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 10 (2014). 
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 144. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, § 111, 127 Stat. 
1165, 1170 (2013); Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 401, 125 Stat. 
240, 259; see also Jeb Hensarling & Patty Murray, Statement of Co-Chairs of the Joint 
Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, DEFICITREDUCTION.GOV, 
http://www.deficitreduction.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=fa0e02f6-2cc2-
4aa6-b32a-3c7f6155806d [https://perma.cc/8Y6H-SC7J] (last visited Oct. 8, 2018). 
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or augmented spending program or tax expenditure be offset with 
revenue cuts or tax increases. Thus, as the budget system currently 
operates, enacted legislation projected to increase the deficit in the 
relevant budget window results in cuts in selected mandatory 
programs, and the government spends less in appropriations than it 
otherwise might. 
Additionally, the House and Senate have internal versions of 
PAYGO that do not have the force of law.145 They provide a procedure 
for members of Congress to raise points of order objecting to 
violations of the PAYGO concept.146 In the Senate, it requires three-
fifths of all members to waive a point of order; in the House, there is 
no exception so a simple majority of the Rules Committee waives a 
point of order.147 The Senate point of order creates an opportunity to 
object if legislation is projected to fail the Senate’s budgetary limits.148 
However, that objection is not automatic. 
These procedural tools trade spending and taxes, but the trading 
is difficult because different committees control elements of each, 
permitting multiple groups to claim credit or blame.149 Trade-offs and 
political maneuvers make the budgeting process opaque for members 
of Congress and the public. By blurring information about how much 
money is being raised and spent, it is hard to know whether the budget 
is balanced. Given political incentives, an obscured budget is likely to 
lead to greater deficit spending. Deficit spending, unless coupled with 
economic growth, raises questions of equity for future generations and 
the federal government’s long-term ability to fund its desired 
projects.150 
Of course, not all deficits are dangerous. Since 1960, the federal 
government has run an on-budget deficit every year except for fiscal 
years 1999 and 2000 and total federal deficits in every year but fiscal 
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ADMIN. REV. 233, 238-39 (2009).  
 150. See Gale & Orszag, supra note 131, at 470; Thomas Laubach, New 
Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt 5 (Fin. & Econ. 
Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2003-12, 2003). 
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year 1969 and 1998 through 2001.151 The CBO expects growing 
deficits in the 2017 to 2026 period.152 Under current law, economic 
growth is expected to be insufficient to cover Congress’s increased 
spending, increasing future deficits. The baseline for 2017 is a $559 
billion deficit or 2.9% of GDP.153  
To fund the deficit, the government incurs debt. Although the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to borrow money, the ability 
to borrow requires that someone is willing to lend.154 U.S. borrowing 
is made to two groups: the public and to other government agencies. 
The first is marketable securities, and the rest are non-marketable in 
that they cannot be sold. Their interest rate is determined by 
competitive bidding.155 For 2017, the federal government spent almost 
7% of its total budget on interest on federal debt.156 This spending is 
required and must be paid in regular intervals because of prior 
government borrowing. In 2016, these payments were approximately 
$432.6 billion and are expected to grow as a percentage of the 
budget.157  
In addition to the need for lenders, the debt ceiling, a political 
device created in 1917, caps the amount the Treasury Department can 
borrow from the public or intragovernmentally.158 However, the debt 
ceiling is also a statutory limitation and not a constitutional 
requirement.159 When it operates, the debt ceiling denies the Treasury 
Department the authority to pay expenditures after the limit is reached, 
even if the expenditures are congressionally approved.160 The Treasury 
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 159. See id. at 288. 
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51, 51 (2013); Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 1, 125 Stat. 240, 
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Department only has limited, extraordinary powers once the ceiling is 
reached.161 These measures would not cover government operations 
for an extended period.162  
In the last half decade, Congress has repeatedly risked hitting the 
debt ceiling and has suspended the debt ceiling for periods, for 
example between October 30, 2015 and March 15, 2017.163 In 2011, 
there was a near default on public debt; the delay in raising the ceiling 
resulted in the first downgrade of the U.S.’s credit rating, a sharp drop 
in the stock market, and an increase in borrowing costs.164 Another 
debt ceiling crisis arose in 2013, resulting in a brief suspension of the 
ceiling after a partial government shutdown and the Treasury 
Department being forced to take extraordinary measures.165 With 
another debt ceiling crisis looming in early September 2017, Congress 
again raised the ceiling, partly justified to aid victims of Hurricane 
Irma. One day before the higher ceiling expired, Congress voted 
another increase until the end of December 2017.166 By late December, 
the Treasury Department was raiding federal pension funds and using 
incoming tax receipts to keep from borrowing.167 With another shut 
down looming, Congress suspended the debt ceiling until March 1, 
2019 with spending caps and a continuing resolution for 
appropriations. 168 
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Because of spending caps, when the government hits the debt 
ceiling, discretionary spending—comprising less than 40% of the 
federal government’s total spending—is singled out for greatest 
reduction.169 As opposed to mandatory spending that is set by its own 
statutes, for instance how the Social Security Act determines the 
amount owed in Social Security, discretionary spending is set through 
the annual appropriations process. Under the budget acts, 
discretionary spending is expected to be reduced by $1.5 trillion from 
fiscal year 2012 to 2021, whereas mandatory spending is projected to 
be reduced by less than $0.2 trillion.170 
A question without an answer is how much government debt is 
permissible.171 Debt as the tool to fund government spending diverts 
the nation’s savings from being invested in productive capital goods 
such as factories and computers.172 However, deficits could be 
counterbalanced by budget surpluses in growth periods so that long-
term budgets are balanced. Alternatively, a balanced budget may not 
be necessary as long as the nation’s GDP increases. If the government 
pays only the interest on its debt and leaves the debt outstanding, the 
debt amount itself remains constant. If GDP increases, the 
accumulated debt becomes a smaller percentage of GDP. Without 
more information on future events, we cannot know if continued 
growth in debt is sustainable. In other words, if national debt is 
significantly greater than national GDP, it is possible that the 
government could not pay off the interest owed plus the debt itself.173  
                                                   
 169. GRANT DRIESSEN & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42506, 
THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011 AS AMENDED: BUDGETARY EFFECTS 2-3 (2015); 
GRANT DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45202, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: 
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR FY2019 AND BEYOND 7 (2018). 
 170. DRIESSEN & LABONTE, supra note 169, at 2-3. 
 171. Government borrowing may make particular sense when its interest rates 
are low. For example, in July 2016, the Treasury Department obtained a negative real 
interest rate on government debt because the inflation rate was greater than the interest 
rate owed on U.S. securities. See Craig Anthony, Can Real Interest Rates Be 
Negative?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 26, 2016); John Hilsenrath, Summers: U.S. Should 
Gradually Shift to More Short-Term Debt, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2014), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/09/30/summers-u-s-should-gradually-shift-
to-more-short-term-debt/?ns=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/5Z5B-XX24]. 
 172. See, e.g., Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 
100 AM. ECON. REV. 573, 574 (2010); Paul Krugman, Debt and Growth: The State of 
the Debate, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2013), https://krugman.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2013/05/31/debt-and-growth-the-state-of-the-debate/ 
[https://perma.cc/4VLV-JREC]; Alexandru Minea & Antoine Parent, Is High Public 
Debt Always Harmful to Economic Growth? 4 (CERDI, Working Paper No. 18, 
2012). 
 173. The International Monetary Fund’s study of market-access economies 
provides that a country’s debt level warrants higher scrutiny if current or projected 
 Tax as Part of a Broken Budget 539 
II. CREATING THE MATERIALS THAT IMPLEMENT THE TAX LAW 
The Treasury Department does not regulate in the same way as 
other agencies. Other agencies may prohibit the public from engaging 
in particular activities or from making particular choices. The 
Treasury Department calculates the tax treatment of the choices that 
taxpayers are free to make. In that light, the materials created by the 
Treasury Department and IRS are intended to tell taxpayers how much 
choices will cost.174 Even without this guidance, the tax would make 
some activities more or less expensive. For taxpayers, the choice 
among activities is properly a post-tax determination, and the value of 
this information is to make the post-tax price more apparent. 
A. Current Procedures  
The Treasury Department and IRS issue a tremendous amount 
of materials, from regulations to public notices, to assist taxpayers in 
their tax compliance and IRS agents in their audits of taxpayers’ 
returns. These agencies do not have unlimited time or funding to issue 
this material. Instead, they make calculated decisions regarding its 
value. Part of that decision-making calculus is the cost of complying 
with government-mandated rules for issuing and revising materials 
that instruct the public on how the law applies. 
1. Tax’s Procedures  
Section 7805(a) gives the Secretary of the Treasury the authority 
to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of 
the Code. Although the underlying legislation is subject to the 
limitations of balanced budgeting rules, tax guidance is not. 
Implementing rules are presumed issued when the law is enacted. 
Therefore, “[t]here is, by definition, no revenue effect for a regulation 
because any and all effects should have already been taken into 
account in the revenue estimate prepared for the underlying 
legislation.”175 All of the economics is based on the legislation itself, 
whether or not the law is self-executing. Nevertheless, regulations and 
                                                   
public debt exceeds 50-60% of GDP or if current or projected public gross financing 
needs exceed 10-15% of GDP. These thresholds are higher than for low-income 
countries because market-access countries can generally sustain higher levels of debt 
than emerging markets. INT’L MONETARY FUND, MODERNIZING THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
FISCAL POLICY AND PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 13 (Aug. 5, 2011). 
 174. Taxes’ cost may make some behavior prohibitively expensive, but that is 
a consequence of Congress’s choice to tax. 
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other materials help make the tax system produce the revenue 
Congress estimates. 
The IRS’s mission is to “[p]rovide America’s taxpayers top 
quality service by helping them understand and meet their tax 
responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to 
all.”176 Before the IRS can do so, the Treasury Department must 
interpret the Internal Revenue Code to determine what it requires, 
particularly when faced with statutory ambiguity in hastily drafted 
provisions. Armed with its understanding, the Treasury Department’s 
guidance to taxpayers and IRS personnel facilitates tax filings and the 
implementation of congressional initiatives. These two groups use 
these materials differently: Taxpayers need rules and interpretations 
to plan their activities and accurately file their tax returns while IRS 
personnel need it to ensure departmental consistency in the application 
of the law. 
Thus, although Congress creates tax law, the Treasury 
Department develops the law in regulations, and its bureau, the IRS, 
administers the developed law.177 However, there may be concern that 
“the regulatory process has been far less transparent” than the 
legislative process.178 Tax guidance is currently created through 
exchanges between the agency and the public, although the Treasury 
Department often relies on exceptions to the APA’s preferred notice-
and-comment process for the issuance of tax guidance.179 Instead of 
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notice and comment, the Treasury Department utilizes other 
procedures for the issuance of regulations and supplemental materials. 
The Treasury Department uses those procedures to produce a 
tremendous amount of information for the public. One study found 
that the Department issued 203 Treasury Decisions and 163 Notices 
of Proposed Rulemaking in 2003 through 2005.180 The amount spent 
to produce guidance is rarely even a feature of the Treasury 
Department’s budget. Recently, while using fewer employee hours, 
the Department has managed to publish more guidance, but this 
growth in efficiency may not be sustainable.181  
To make the process of producing regulations and other 
materials more transparent, the IRS incorporates public input in 
choosing which projects are chosen for development.182 To create the 
resulting Priority Guidance Plan, which lists current and upcoming 
projects, the IRS annually solicits taxpayer input.183 However, the 
process by which the Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy puts proposals 
into semiannual agenda is not publicly disclosed, and new legislation 
or events might change listed priorities without notice. There is a 
downside to public involvement in this process in that it permits 
measurement of fiscal year-end accomplishment of the listed tasks.184 
Projects expected to take longer than the twelve-month reporting 
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period tend to be deferred because they will adversely affect those 
measurements.185  
Projects initiated from the agenda are assigned to the Office of 
the Chief Counsel of the IRS, effectively the IRS’s internal law firm, 
to begin the drafting process.186 The public may be alerted to the 
agency’s interpretation of an issue at different times in the drafting 
process. Either with an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking or a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Treasury Department describes 
when the agency is considering or is issuing guidance, describing the 
anticipated approach and seeking public feedback on that approach.187 
The Treasury Department may also warn that the future regulations 
will have retroactive effect. 
For example, Notice 98-5 on the Foreign Tax Credit Abuse was 
issued in 1997 and warned multi-national corporations against 
entering or considering abusive tax-motivated transactions to acquire 
foreign tax credits to shelter low-taxed foreign source income.188 The 
targeted transactions occur when either tax benefits are duplicated in 
the U.S. and the foreign country or if a corporation purchases an 
income stream with a nonrecourse loan so tax credits are effectively 
purchased. The notice requested public comments before the issuance 
of regulations. However, regulations on this issue have never been 
issued, and the notice was withdrawn in 2004 when the IRS admitted 
it did not intend to issue these regulations.189  
Regardless of whether earlier notice has been provided, the 
Treasury Department must issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
announcing proposed regulations, published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, and include draft language.190 In addition to this 
disclosure for regulations, other tax materials are made public through 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). FOIA was extended to the 
IRS in 1996, making less formal guidance publicly available.191  
The IRS’s Internal Revenue Manual describes the method for 
drafting proposed regulatory language.192 The IRS holds the pen in 
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drafting regulations but receives guidance from the Treasury’s Office 
of Tax Policy (OTP) because the OTP makes executive policy 
decisions and analysis.193 Members of the IRS Office of Chief Counsel 
and an attorney from the OTP work together on language and these, 
plus others if the need arises, jointly identify issues, informally 
exchange drafts of regulations, and hold guidance briefings as 
needed.194  
Before being proposed to the public, draft language is submitted 
to various constituents within the Treasury Department in order to 
have widespread internal acceptance of its content.195 Only when the 
language reaches the highest level of internal review is input received 
from outside the Department. This external review includes the 
executive’s OMB, a new requirement as the OMB has increased its 
power over the shape of tax regulations.196 If the Assistant Secretary 
for Tax Policy signs off on the proposed language, it becomes a 
proposed regulation to be published. This first internal step takes 
anywhere from months to years.197  
Once initially published, the group of drafters solicits public 
comments on the proposed regulations, and this is when the Treasury 
Department officially receives feedback from taxpayers or their 
representatives.198 Although many hearings are scheduled, most are 
canceled because no one in the public accepts the invitation to 
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participate.199 Notwithstanding this formal process, many scholars 
argue that the majority of comments received on tax regulations are 
informal and delivered over the phone.200 After the public comment 
period has lapsed and assuming that no major changes are required in 
response to comments, the group prepares final regulations and drafts 
issues memoranda.201 The Commissioner (or Deputy Commissioner) 
of the IRS and an Assistant Secretary (or Deputy Assistant) for Tax 
Policy then sign the final regulations.202 However, if major changes are 
required, the process may begin again with another notice-and-
comment period. 
After tax regulations are signed, they may not automatically 
become effective. Congress provides a standard thirty-day waiting 
period to provide people “reasonable time to prepare” for complying 
with the rules.203 However, there is an exception to the standard thirty-
day waiting period for tax regulations, but the current exception is less 
lenient than it once was. Before 1996, the default was that all tax 
regulations applied retroactively.204 In 1996, Congress amended the 
rule so that no type of tax regulation for any statute enacted after 1996 
can have an effective date before the earlier of (1) the date the final 
regulation is published in the Federal Register, (2) the date any notice 
substantially describing the proposed, temporary, or final regulation is 
published, or (3) in case of a final regulation, the date the proposed or 
temporary regulation to which it relates is published, and earlier in the 
case of abusive transactions.205 Thus, today’s exceptions permit 
retroactive effective dates for tax regulations when they are issued 
relatively quickly after enactment of the statute. 
2. APA Procedures 
Critics complain that the Treasury Department’s process is 
inappropriate because it fails to comply with notice and comment.206 
They argue that “changes in administrative law doctrine . . . have not 
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penetrated fully into IRS practice or judicial precedents concerning 
IRS rules and regulations.”207 This is part of a wave of attacks against 
Treasury Department procedures that are seen not to comply with the 
APA. Since 2011, when the Supreme Court warned in the Chevron 
context for judicial deference that the IRS will not be granted a special 
exemption from administrative law,208 what compliance with the APA 
requires and the extent to which that compliance is necessary to ensure 
the quality of tax regulations have been hot topics.209  
Section 553 of the APA requires federal agencies to provide the 
public with notice of proposed rules as well as an opportunity to 
comment on those rules.210 For this purpose, the term “rule” is defined 
broadly enough to encompass virtually any agency statement about 
what regulated parties must or should do.211 Therefore, if an agency is 
going to dictate some aspect of the public’s behavior, the agency must 
first tell the public of the proposed requirements and give them the 
chance to comment on those requirements. These procedures are to 
ensure that the public has a voice in the rules that govern them.212  
However, the notice-and-comment procedures may 
inadvertently make it harder for agencies to move closer to the ideal 
by increasing the cost of issuing any form of guidance to the public.213 
Thus, exceptions from these procedures exist but are limited in order 
to maintain a robust dialogue between agencies and the public.214 The 
exceptions exist to guarantee that other public interests are not 
sacrificed in the quest for public participation.215 
Put most basically, the notice-and-comment process requires 
that the public be given notice of all federal agencies’ proposed rules 
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unless Congress explicitly legislates otherwise.216 For example, notice 
must provide sufficient factual details and rationales to permit the 
public a “fair chance” to comment meaningfully.217 Courts have 
required notice to include critical data so that people commenting on 
proposed language can make meaningful submissions responding to 
the agency’s evidence.218 Before the rule is finalized, the agency must 
consider the public’s submission of written data, views, or arguments 
after a reasonable comment period.219  
Finally, the resulting rule must be published at least thirty days 
before it takes effect unless there is good cause for an earlier effective 
date.220 Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts to limit lower courts from 
adding requirements to this statutorily defined process, lower courts 
have interpreted the statutory requirements expansively, developing a 
common-law life beyond these strict statutory prescriptions.221  
A critical component of the process is that final regulations must 
be submitted to the Federal Register with a “concise general statement 
of their basis and purpose.”222 Courts have effectively eliminated 
“concise” from this APA requirement.223 In Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Supreme Court urged lower courts to 
engage in a “searching and careful” review of agency actions.224 To 
facilitate that review, agencies must provide courts a 
contemporaneous administrative record of their decision-making that 
permits this “hard look” review.225 Consequently, the statement must 
contain the agency’s findings and reasoning so that any reviewing 
court is able “to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the 
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informal proceedings[,] [] why the agency reacted to them as it did[,]” 
and that the agency considered public comments.226 
The process is time consuming. Not only does it often take years 
to get a rule ready for public notice,227 but the comment period is 
typically sixty days.228 Following the comment period, the agency 
must consider “the relevant matter presented” in the comments.229 
Although required to consider and incorporate comments in the final 
regulation, the agency cannot change the rule substantially in response 
to comments without starting the notice-and-comment process over 
again.230 Only those changes that are a “logical outgrowth” of the 
proposed rule may be made without restarting the process for fear that 
the public did not have adequate notice or the opportunity to comment 
on the revised language.231  
3. Types of Regulations 
Although a number of tax regulations proceed through the 
notice-and-comment process to become final regulations, many do 
not.232 Final regulations are the most authoritative and the only 
regulations to have completed all internal and external review.233 The 
Treasury Department often modifies notice and comment by issuing 
temporary and proposed regulations simultaneously.234 Proposed 
regulations have completed internal review but have not yet completed 
the public’s review.235 Temporary tax regulations have the same 
authority as final regulations despite rarely being submitted to notice 
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and comment.236 Thus, with the simultaneous issuance of proposed and 
temporary regulations, the comment period occurs after publication of 
guidance that is binding on the public.237  
It is temporary regulations’ combination of speedy publication 
and lack of public review that raises objections but makes them 
popular with the Treasury Department.238 Some complain that 
temporary regulations’ lack of procedure “obliterate[s] the APA’s 
notice-and-comment procedures.”239 Temporary tax regulations are 
pervasive. The Treasury Department has issued a significant number 
of them since the number of statutes enacted in the 1980s created a 
backlog of needed regulations.240 In a study of 232 regulatory projects, 
from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2005, more than one-
third were issued with only post-promulgation notice and comment.241  
Starting in 1988, temporary regulations are only effective for 
three years, requiring the Treasury Department to finalize 
regulations.242 However, a question remains whether temporary 
regulations need the same process of ex ante public comment as final 
regulations. The Treasury Department has argued, largely 
unsuccessfully, that Congress provided the short period of 
effectiveness and required the simultaneous issuance of proposed 
regulations as a political trade off permitting the continued, shorter-
term use of temporary regulations without notice and comment.243 It is 
plausible, but unproven, that when Congress enacted the limiting 
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period it was aware of the backlog of tax law changes and taxpayers’ 
desire for guidance and expected the Treasury Department to continue 
issuing temporary regulations but with post-promulgation notice and 
comment. If that was the case, Congress did not say so, although it has 
in other contexts. For example, Congress explicitly permitted 
regulations with post-promulgation comments with respect to the 
Health Care Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.244 
One argument the Treasury Department uses to support this 
procedure is that most of its regulations are interpretative and therefore 
do not require any notice and comment.245 The Treasury Department 
persists in using an expansive definition of interpretive regulations 
based on the origin of the authority to issue regulations. Regulations 
can be initiated for any provision of the Internal Revenue Code, but a 
catchall provision, § 7805(a), grants the Treasury Department 
significant power to issue rules.246 The Treasury Department interprets 
this broad power as the source of interpretive regulations. Therefore, 
all regulations that are sourced to § 7805(a) are, according to the 
Department, interpretive. Under this interpretation, only legislative 
regulations originating from specific authority in a particular 
provision require notice and comment.247 In one studied period, the 
Treasury Department claimed that more than 90% of temporary 
regulations were interpretive and that public comment was not 
required.248  
This distinction between interpretive and legislative regulations 
may be invalid under administrative law. Most other agencies 
recognize regulations as legislative.249 Focusing on the potential 
penalties taxpayers face if they fail to follow interpretive tax 
regulations, Professor Kristin Hickman argues that the distinction 
reflects a historical understanding no longer consistent with changes 
in administrative law doctrine.250 According to this argument, all tax 
regulations except those issued under the good cause exception would 
need pre-promulgation notice-and-comment review. 
Although the Treasury Department may lack justification for its 
preferred procedure, Congress is aware that the Treasury Department 
retains this distinction between legislative and interpretive 
                                                   
 244. See 26 U.S.C. § 9833 (2012); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 401, 110 Stat. 1936, 2073. 
 245. See IRS, supra note 187 32.1.1.2.8 (Aug. 2, 2018). 
 246. See § 7805(a). 
 247. See id.  
 248. Hickman, supra note 180, at 1752. 
 249. See Asimow, supra note 192, at 373; Johnson, supra note 238, at 837.  
 250. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 520 n.117 (citing Professor 
Hickman’s argument). 
550 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
regulations. Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis Act, 
agencies must analyze the impact of proposed rules on small 
businesses. The requirement generally applies only to rules that go 
through notice and comment, which the Treasury Department 
contends is only specific-authority regulations.251 Recognizing this 
distinction, Congress added a special requirement applicable only to 
tax to include interpretive rules as well as legislative ones.252 In the 
limited context of the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis Act, Congress 
chose to override the Treasury Department’s distinction without 
eliminating it generally. 
B. The Impact of These Agency-Created Materials 
The existence of materials explaining and applying the tax law, 
in particular tax regulations, is critical to taxpayer compliance and 
government consistency. These materials facilitate compliance by 
providing inquisitive taxpayers information and facilitate national 
uniformity by binding IRS employees. Although taxpayers are not 
always required to follow agency interpretations of the law, if 
taxpayers are audited, the government must generally comply with its 
own rules.  
1. Guidance for Taxpayers and IRS Agents 
Official interpretations of tax laws help internal and external 
audiences. Taxpayers need to know how the law is being interpreted 
in order to properly plan their affairs. But no less important is the 
information for IRS employees to know how to consistently enforce 
the law. Facing hundreds of issues, the agency needs to create a 
coherent policy for its almost 78,000 employees (and more than 
116,000 in 1992).253 Without that policy, individual IRS agents cannot 
fairly enforce the law. The agency’s interpretation of the law, made 
public through publication or FOIA, also shines public light on 
Treasury Department and IRS operations. Practitioners and politicians 
can see how the law is being applied and use that knowledge to 
challenge interpretations they dislike. Thus, Congress can learn of the 
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public’s disagreements with the IRS through reactions to tax guidance 
and can make adjustments as Congress sees fit. 
This assistance and the opportunity for differing interpretations 
of law to otherwise develop is particularly great in tax because much 
of tax law is created through amendments to the Internal Revenue 
Code. Statutory changes are often fragments, adding clauses and 
isolated sentences to existing provisions that are not set forth in the 
bill.254 Moreover, the interrelation of many different provisions, such 
as those governing international taxation, should create a workable 
whole, but the unifying theory is not explicitly laid out in the statute 
itself. Therefore, the interpretation of the words added in a particular 
statute must be consistent with the underlying intent of the law, even 
when the words themselves could have multiple meanings. 
Although the materials that the Treasury Department and IRS 
produce are imperfect, most tax practitioners are relatively happy with 
them.255 One critic of the Treasury Department’s procedures for 
adopting tax guidance noted, “[m]ost members of the tax community 
believe that Treasury does a decent job in drafting regulations and 
instead focus their grumbling on issues where guidance is lacking.”256 
One Wharton School professor noted: “[I]f a regime is designed to 
give bureaucrats flexibility and hold them accountable for their 
results—a management technique taught in many business 
schools . . . —then Treasury’s administrative model might seem to be 
an exemplar rather than a problem.”257 The materials provide 
information to taxpayers, who complain when it is not provided, and 
increase IRS personnel’s transparency and consistency. 
Despite its evident value, not all of these materials have the same 
authority to bind taxpayers. Since Mayo held that tax regulations are 
to be given Chevron deference, there is a risk that regulations with 
lesser procedural protections may be given too much deference, 
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however that is defined.258 Although in Mayo, the Court noted 
adherence to notice and comment as “good indicators of a rule 
meriting Chevron deference,” the inverse may also exist, meaning that 
rules created without notice and comment might bind taxpayers’ 
choices without public participation.259 The level of deference courts 
give to guidance is a matter of judicial interpretation of the APA, over 
which the Treasury Department has no power. Therefore, the Treasury 
Department does not have the option of choosing less deference in 
exchange for less process. 260 
It is unclear how much the level of judicial deference matters in 
practice but for the pressure the distinction adds to procedural 
questions. In Swallows Holding, Ltd v. Commissioner, a Barbardos 
corporation dealing in real property in the U.S. sought to claim 
deductions related to its real estate holdings.261 At issue was the filing 
deadline because, according to the regulations, the corporation filed 
too late to claim deductions.262 The Tax Court ruled for the taxpayer, 
invalidating the regulation, and held that the same result would occur 
whether the court applied Chevron or a lesser deference standard.263 
The Circuit Court overturned the decision on the ground that the 
regulation was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.264 
The Circuit Court said Chevron definitely applied and was willing to 
give Chevron deference to interpretive regulations, although that 
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deference was possibly tied to the regulations having completed notice 
and comment.265 
Thus, procedure might increase the weight given to the 
government’s interpretation of the law and, in the process, might 
increase the agency’s legitimacy. “Agencies which listen and respond 
to public comment enhance their legitimacy and accountability, both 
of critical importance when decision-making is delegated to a 
nonrepresentative, politically insulated body.”266 However, one can 
question whether responding to public comments in a formalized 
process would enhance the IRS’s or its guidance’s legitimacy in an era 
when some politicians want to shut down the IRS.267 Moreover, 
although the IRS is staffed with career employees, the IRS as an entity 
is far from politically insulated. The public is aware through the press 
of the agency’s actions on salient issues or through their advisors if 
the issue applies to them. For issues that are neither salient nor 
personally applicable, notice and comment is unlikely to make the 
public more aware than it is now. 
If these materials, whether regulations or other guidance, are 
found not to comply with required procedures, they may be nullified. 
Courts can vacate a rule, which invalidates the rule and requires the 
agency begin the rulemaking process anew, or remand it, which keeps 
the rule in effect but requires the agency to remedy the problem and 
readopt the rule.268 Most courts accept that they have discretion as to 
the choice of approach and tend to consider potential damage to the 
public interest from setting aside a rule.269 Some judges, however, 
believe that the APA requires vacating a rule because § 706(2)(A) 
provides that a reviewing court confronted with a procedurally invalid 
rule “shall . . . hold [it] unlawful and set [it] aside.”270 
The court’s choice affects the agency’s ability to move forward 
with its official interpretation. If the interpretation is vacated, it 
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eliminates penalties and the public’s corresponding incentive for 
compliance.271 Moreover, it reduces available guidance for those who 
would otherwise choose to rely upon it. However, if the case is 
remanded, one study of D.C. Circuit cases found that the agency was 
able to reinstate the same or similar rule in 80% of the cases with an 
average delay of less than two years.272 Therefore, at least with 
remand, the failure to follow procedures merely cost time and 
uncertainty but did not prevent the agency from adopting what it 
thought was the best rule. Remand does not, however, guarantee 
anything else. 
Additionally, increasing the cost of issuing these types of 
materials risks less being produced.273 The procedures’ cost plus the 
length of time required for their issuance will almost certainly reduce 
the amount of information provided internally to IRS employees and 
to taxpayers.274 This information is necessary to ensure consistent 
audits so that taxpayers can plan their affairs and be treated fairly. 
2. Penalties When Taxpayers Fail to Follow Them 
As the tax system currently operates, the threat of significant 
civil penalties encourages compliance with tax regulations and other 
forms of government-issued guidance, even those that fail to go 
through notice and comment. Focusing on regulations, if a taxpayer 
fails to pay the proper amount of tax and, in the process, disregards 
published regulations, financial penalties may be imposed in addition 
to the tax itself and interest on the tax due.275 Penalties apply to 
temporary and final regulations and whether they are interpretive or 
legislative. However, there are exceptions to the penalty for a 
taxpayer’s good-faith disagreement over the regulations.276 Thus, 
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presumption that the IRS’s determination of negligence is greater than unreasonable 
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evidence. See Barlow v. Comm’r, 301 F.3d 714, 724 (6th Cir. 2002).  
 276. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2016). 
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taxpayers can ignore any regulation if they reasonably think that the 
regulation is incorrect but not if they just do not like the regulation or 
did not bother to read it.  
Financial penalties can be significant. Penalties of 20% of the 
underpayment are imposed for “[n]egligence or disregard of rules and 
regulations.”277 This means that penalties may be imposed for the 
careless, reckless, or intentional disregard of temporary or final 
regulations and most other published tax guidance.278 However, civil 
penalties generally cannot be imposed when the taxpayer believes the 
regulations are an incorrect interpretation of the statute. If a taxpayer 
takes a position contrary to a regulation and that contrary position has 
a realistic possibility—meaning a greater than one-third likelihood—
of being sustained on the merits, the taxpayer is not susceptible to a 
penalty for disregarding the regulations.279  
Additionally, taxpayers can typically avoid penalties by 
disclosing that the tax return takes a position contrary to a 
regulation.280 Disclosure represents a good faith challenge to a 
regulation’s validity unless the taxpayer fails to keep adequate records 
to properly substantiate the items or there is no reasonable basis for 
the challenge.281 Having no reasonable basis for a different 
interpretation of the statute is a lower threshold, permitting taxpayers 
to prevail with only a 5% or 10% chance of being sustained in court.282  
Regardless of any ability to avoid penalties, it may be unfair to 
hold taxpayers responsible for following regulations that have not 
completed notice and comment.283 For such rules, taxpayers have not 
had the opportunity to publicly comment on the rules they are bound 
to follow. Additionally, it may be problematic to impose financial 
penalties for the failure to obey rules that are the Treasury 
Department’s interpretation of the law, as courts are the final arbiter 
of legal interpretation.  
                                                   
 277. § 6662(a), (b)(1).  
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There is also debate over the usefulness of penalties in the tax 
context and whether penalties increase or decrease tax compliance.284 
With a 0.6% personal audit rate in a tax system with over 244 million 
tax returns, penalties may be viewed as necessary to minimize the 
likelihood of tax evasion.285 However, people who fail to read these 
rules and regulations may also be unaware of penalties. If that occurs, 
penalties are a post-hoc tool for punishing abuse and compensation to 
the government for detecting it. A proper evaluation of penalties’ 
effectiveness is beyond the scope of this Article. Any move to 
eliminate financial penalties from the system for failure to comply 
with the Treasury Department and IRS’s published materials needs a 
comprehensive evaluation of the impact of doing so. 
Despite penalties for failing to follow published guidance 
potentially being costly, this failure cannot result in incarceration. 
Although there are criminal penalties imposed under the Internal 
Revenue Code, disregard of regulations or other published materials 
is not grounds for criminal prosecution.286 Criminal tax evasion is 
defined as the willful attempt to evade or defeat the income tax.287 
Therefore, tax crimes require an affirmative act constituting evasion 
and willfulness, neither of which exists because of a disagreement 
over the content of a regulation or even failing to read the regulation.288 
Even if a jury was not instructed that a “bad purpose” or “evil purpose” 
is necessary for criminal evasion,289 a good faith misunderstanding of 
tax law is a defense, and the Supreme Court has held that this 
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understanding need not even be objectively reasonable.290 Negligence, 
even gross negligence, does not establish criminal willfulness.291 
C. Recent Judicial Challenges to Tax Materials 
Agencies know that their published materials are subject to 
judicial review. However, even agency rules that complete the notice-
and-comment process are not free from judicial invalidation. One 
study found that courts reject 30% of rules that go through notice and 
comment because the agency did not adequately respond to one or 
more submitted comments. 292 Invalidation is increasingly likely in the 
tax context as courts hear cases applying the APA in ways that are new 
in this area of law. As discussed below, many recent tax cases have 
been decided on arguments regarding procedure, most of which have 
struck down Treasury Department regulations.  
1. Judicial Review of Notice and Comment in Tax Cases 
The APA incentivizes litigation over agency compliance with 
notice-and-comment procedures.293 Judicial review is to proceed with 
a hard look at agency action, and it imposes close substantive judicial 
review of agency guidance.294 Although the meaning of hard-look 
review is subject to debate, it is clear that courts are to intervene in 
cases of procedural inadequacies.295 If the court becomes aware that an 
agency has not really taken a “hard look” at problems identified by the 
public or has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making, 
regulations must be invalidated.296 As part of this review, courts can 
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take a hard look to ensure that an agency has adequately considered 
all comments and that the agency has adequately supported its 
contested assumptions.297 
Even though courts often do not use the term “hard-look review” 
and the depth of review varies over time, the threat of invalidation 
remains a concern for agencies as they draft guidance.298 One difficulty 
with hard-look review is that the doctrine imposes no rules regarding 
the size, number, detail, or technicality of the issues that can be raised 
in the comment period or how the courts will assess the validity and 
importance of those comments.299 Professor Jerry Mashaw argues that 
courts function as “robbed roulette wheels” when reviewing agency 
guidance.300 Therefore, it is impossible to know the appropriate 
specificity to use for a rebuttal. Agencies may rationally devote 
excessive or inadequate resources to this process. 
Because of the general uncertainty regarding hard-look review, 
an overarching issue is the extent to which the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirement applies to tax regulations and tax guidance 
more generally. Since 2011, when Mead was decided,301 courts have 
heard a number of cases in which the APA was used to strike down 
tax guidance. Few of these cases have explicitly reached a conclusion 
on whether guidance should be vacated or remanded, although the 
likely result is that the guidance is vacated and the statute left without 
implementing rules. 
In one such case, Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer 
sued over international tax regulations governing agreements between 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations.302 The regulations at issue 
were issued under § 482, governing the tax treatment of cost-sharing 
arrangements among related parties. This arrangement is part of 
transfer pricing, which allocates expenses among subsidiaries in 
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to debate. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 183-84 (1983), with Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and 
Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297, 312 (2004). 
 298. See LUBBERS, supra note 228, at 434-38; see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 
Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of 
the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1190 (1988); Hertz, supra 
note 297, at 308-18; Sunstein, supra note 297, at 181-84; see also Patricia M. Wald, 
Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and 
Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 233-34 (1996). 
 299. PIERCE, supra note 295, at 447-50; Rubin, supra note 295, at 116-18; 
Wagner, supra note 200, at 1352. 
 300. Wagner, supra note 200, at 1360 n.151 (citing JERRY L. MASHAW, 
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 181 (1999)). 
 301. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2000). 
 302. See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 134 (T.C. 2015). 
 Tax as Part of a Broken Budget 559 
different countries.303 Therefore, the taxpayers affected by the 
regulations tended to be educated on tax law. The regulations had gone 
through notice and comment and the issue was well known and hotly 
debated long before the Altera case.304 
According to the Tax Court, the Treasury Department’s six-page 
preamble to the regulations was not an adequate statement responding 
to the thirteen submitted comments and four participants in the 
hearings.305 At the time the final rule was issued, the Treasury 
Department’s files did not contain expert opinions, empirical data, or 
articles that supported its position.306 Consequently, in Altera a 
unanimous Tax Court invalidated the regulations. By adopting a hard-
look review of the regulatory process, the court found that the agency 
must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action.307 While the court accepted that 
“[i]mproving administrability can be a reasonable basis for agency 
action,” the Treasury Department did not make this claim in its 
preamble (although even if it did, it does not appear the court would 
have accepted this claim without more significant fact-finding).308 
From Altera, it appears that the Tax Court, which hears 95% of all tax 
litigation, believes that all tax regulations are subject to notice and 
comment.309  
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In late 2017, the Altera appeal was argued before the Ninth 
Circuit.310 According to the government, the regulations did not rest on 
empirical conclusions, so the APA rules were not implicated.311 
According to Professor Kristin Hickman, it is possible that the 
appellate court was troubled having the Tax Court adjudicate APA 
litigation.312  This case has since been subject to rehearing with the 
panel’s focus in oral arguments on the substantive reasonableness of 
the regulations, with only some discussion of the Treasury 
Department’s compliance with the APA.313 
On the other hand, although a case not focusing on the procedure 
used to promulgate a regulation, in Balestra v. United States, the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may have signaled that it has 
backtracked from hard-look review.314 In Balestra, a husband and wife 
who filed a joint tax return brought a refund suit for employment taxes 
on deferred compensation that was vested but that the husband would 
never receive because his employer went bankrupt.315 The issue was 
the regulatory definition of deferred compensation for purposes of 
payroll taxes.  
Not noting that the regulations had gone through notice and 
comment, the court focused on the fact that the regulation complied 
with the scant legislative history available.316 Although purporting to 
apply hard-look review, the court cursorily repeated the notice of 
proposed and final rulemaking. That “the regulation in this case does 
not conflict with the statute” permitted the court to uphold the 
regulation.317 In doing so, the court found that the Treasury 
Department did not act arbitrarily or capriciously but that, instead, it 
sought simple, workable, and flexible rules; the “path” used to create 
the regulations was “reasonably discernable.”318 
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2. Temporary Regulations and Timing 
As discussed in Subsection II.A.3, the Treasury Department’s 
temporary regulations are subject to challenge when the Department 
does not use notice and comment for their issuance. The Treasury 
Department generally relies on Congress’s three-year limitation to 
issue them, often concurrently with proposed regulations proceeding 
through notice and comment.319 Taxpayers are challenging this 
assumption, and some courts that have heard the issue have sided with 
taxpayers over the government. Taxpayers generally want to litigate 
these matters before regulations or other guidance apply. On the other 
hand, Congress decided in 1867 that pre-enforcement litigation would 
stifle the government’s ability to raise revenue.320 Congress limited 
taxpayers’ ability to engage in pre-enforcement litigation in the tax 
context.321 However, much as taxpayers are winning with respect to 
temporary regulations, they are winning earlier in the process. 
The issue of temporary regulations came before the Tax Court in 
Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner.322 In 
response to a widely sold tax shelter, Son of BOSS, the Treasury 
Department issued temporary regulations providing that inflated tax 
basis would trigger the extended period of limitation for substantial 
understatements of income.323 According to the agency’s 
interpretation, Congress authorized a tax-specific exception to notice 
and comment for temporary regulations for three years.324 The Tax 
Court refused to accept the temporary regulations not because of their 
procedure but on the grounds that an earlier Supreme Court decision 
precluded the Treasury Department’s interpretation.325 A concurring 
opinion by Judges James Halpern and Mark Holmes discussed in 
                                                   
 319. See Hickman, supra note 180, at 1748-51. 
 320. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Pre-enforcement Litigation Needed for 
Taxing Procedures, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1317, 1343-1344 (2017). 
 321. The Anti-Injunction Act, in 26 U.S.C. § 7421, denies injunctive relief by 
generally disallowing “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection 
of any tax [to] be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person 
is the person against whom such taxes was assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2012).The 
Declaratory Judgment Act contains a broader tax exception that prevents courts from 
providing declaratory relief for controversies “with respect to Federal taxes.” 28 
U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).  
 322. See 134 T.C. 211, 245-46 (T.C. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 
691 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 323. See id. at 211. 
 324. Judges Halpern and Holmes of the Tax Court rejected this interpretation. 
See id. at 245-46 (Halpern, J., concurring). 
 325. See id. at 213 (quoting Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm’r, 128 
T.C. 207, 215 (T.C. 2007)). 
562 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
detail their objection to the Treasury Department’s claim to a political 
trade off of the short-term life of temporary regulations for forgoing 
notice and comment.326 
More recently, in Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, a federal district 
court vacated regulations after finding that the Anti-Injunction Act did 
not prevent pre-enforcement review of procedural challenges under 
the APA.327 The Anti-Injunction Act is normally interpreted as 
requiring a delay in tax litigation until after the law is enforced against 
a particular taxpayer.328 However, in Chamber of Commerce, the court 
allowed the litigation.329 Ruling that the Anti-Injunction Act did not 
preclude review of this pre-enforcement activity, the court also 
rejected the claim that temporary regulations could be issued without 
notice and comment simply because of the limitation in § 7805(e) that 
they are valid for only three years.330 The court did not question the 
Treasury Department’s authority to issue the regulations with proper 
procedure.331 
The regulations in Chamber of Commerce were politically 
sensitive, involving rules to reduce corporations’ tax advantage from 
relocating their headquarters to other countries.332 Popularly called 
corporate inversions, this relocation of headquarters seeks to remove 
much of a corporation’s foreign-source income from the U.S.’s 
worldwide tax reach.333 The regulations responded to a statutory 
provision permitting the Treasury Department to modify the 
application of a statute to “prevent the avoidance of [its] purposes” but 
were issued in 2016 as temporary regulations without notice and 
comment.334  
The regulations made it more likely a corporate inversion would 
run afoul of a 2004 statute.335 In 2004, Congress enacted legislation 
                                                   
 326. See id. at 238-48; see also, Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting 
Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643, 683-84 (2012). 
 327. Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 
1:16-CV-944-LY, 2017 WL 4682050, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2017). 
 328. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Pre-Enforcement Litigation Needed for 
Taxing Procedures, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1317, 1343-44 (2017). 
 329. See Chamber of Commerce, 2017 WL 4682050, at *6. 
 330. See id. at *7. 
 331. Andy Grewal, Loss in Anti-Inversion Case Strikes Potentially Major 
Blow on IRS’s Rulemaking Authority, YALE J. REG., NOTICE AND COMMENT (Sept. 30, 
2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/loss-in-anti-inversion-case-strikes-potentially- 
major-blow-to-irss-rulemaking-authority [https://perma.cc/ZYD2-3RDA]. 
 332. Treas. Reg. §1.7874-8T. 
 333. STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHON, PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY 354 (2d ed. 
2018). See id. for more on U.S. international taxation. 
 334. 26 U.S.C. § 7874(g) (2012); see also § 7874(c)(6). 
 335. See § 7874. 
 Tax as Part of a Broken Budget 563 
that limited a U.S. corporation’s ability to merge into a foreign 
company to limit the income subject to U.S. taxation.336 The 2004 rules 
ignore merger inversions, meaning the corporation will continue to 
taxed as a U.S. taxpayer, if U.S. shareholders retain a substantial stake, 
defined as 80% of the voting and value, in the new foreign parent 
corporation. Limitations on favorable tax elements may apply if U.S. 
shareholders hold less than 80% but more than 60% of the new 
entity.337 In face of the rule, corporations must plan more in order to 
invert overseas. In 2014, Pfizer, Walgreen, and Medtronic each 
proposed high-profile inversions. Although the press questioned 
whether transactions were unpatriotic, Congress failed to act.338 
Instead, the Treasury Department issued these temporary regulations 
that added a three-year lookback rule to ensure the foreign company 
did not increase its size to avoid the statutory inversion threshold.339 
These rules make it less likely that a U.S.-based company will be 
recognized as inverting if it merges into a smaller foreign company.  
Despite taxpayer resistance, in the short term, the Treasury 
Department’s strategy was successful. The Pfizer deal was called off, 
with the company stating that the decision “was driven by the actions 
announced by the U.S. Department of Treasury.”340 However, since 
then, the regulations have suffered judicial defeat and have continued 
a string of cases that strictly apply the APA in the tax context. 
One judicial means of permitting pre-enforcement litigation is 
for courts to interpret the Anti-Injunction Act’s subject matter in a 
limited way. For example, in Chamber of Commerce, the court limited 
the Anti-Injunction Act to lawsuits over taxes determined to be 
owed.341 Therefore, the Anti-Injunction Act does not cover the 
situation in which the “[p]laintiffs challenge the validity of the Rule 
so that a reasoned decision can be made about whether to engage in a 
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potential future transaction that would subject them to taxation under 
the Rule.”342  
This Chamber of Commerce interpretation is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Direct Marketing Association v. 
Brohl, which narrowly read the Tax Injunction Act, a law similar to 
the Anti-Injunction Act but one that prohibits federal district courts 
from hearing challenges to state taxes.343 At issue in Direct Marketing, 
a Colorado law required retailers to notify Colorado customers of 
potential use tax liability and required retailers to report tax-related 
information to state tax authorities.344 Thus, the law imposed notice 
and reporting obligations but no tax. The taxpayer successfully limited 
the activities for the “assessment and collection of tax” that cannot be 
challenged prior to enforcement, and so the Tax Injunction Act did not 
apply.345  
The analysis of Direct Marketing, if applied to the Anti-
Injunction Act, would greatly expand the number of cases that could 
be heard prior to enforcement because of the federal tax system’s 
copious information gathering. Although assessment “might also be 
understood more broadly to encompass the process by which [the] 
amount [of tax liability] is calculated,” the Court chose to interpret it 
as the official action taken based on information already reported.346 
In the Court’s opinion in Direct Marketing, collection occurs only 
“after a formal assessment” and is part of the enforcement process.347 
In this narrow reading of assessment, any guidance regarding anything 
that occurs prior to a tax return being filed is open to pre-enforcement 
litigation.  
However, later in 2015, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
dismissed pre-enforcement litigation over the Treasury Department’s 
compliance with the APA.348 The case involved Treasury Department-
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issued regulations governing banks’ reporting requirements for the 
interest income earned by non-U.S. taxpayers who were from certain 
treaty countries.349 The interest is not taxable in the U.S., but, 
according to the Treasury Department, the information is necessary to 
comply with information-sharing agreements with other countries.350 
The bankers’ association argued that the Treasury Department acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider that some people 
would withdraw funds from U.S. banks in response to the reporting 
requirement.  
In Florida Bankers Association v. Department of the Treasury, 
the court held that the Anti-Injunction Act prevents this review of 
procedural matters.351 The Circuit Court held it was not permissible to 
circumvent the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act by 
challenging only the regulatory aspect of a regulatory tax.352 Earlier, 
the District Court had been unwilling to rely on the Anti-Injunction 
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act because the regulations did not 
restrain the assessment or collection of taxes but only imposed a 
reporting requirement.353 Although seemingly at variance with Direct 
Marketing, rehearing en banc was denied, as was certiorari.354 
Nevertheless, this case may be inconsistent with the new narrower 
reading of these statutes.355 
                                                   
 349. See Fla. Bankers, 799 F.3d at 1068.  
 350. See id. at 1068. 
 351. See id. at 1067; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2012). 
 352. See Fla. Bankers, 799 F.3d at 1070. 
 353. See Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 19 F. Supp. 3d 111, 
121 (D.D.C. 2014). Although the court ultimately sided with the government, it 
lessened the government’s protection from pre-enforcement procedural litigation. Id. 
at 120-21. Banks do not owe tax on the reported income even though a penalty, 
defined in the Code to be a tax, attached if a bank fails to meet its reporting 
requirements. The penalty is in Chapter 68, Subchapter B, Section 6721. Section 
6671(a) defines penalties imposed by Title 26, including Chapter 68, Subchapter B, 
as taxes unless otherwise provided. This differs from Foodservice & Lodging Inst., 
Inc. v. Regan, in which plaintiffs were allowed to challenge only the regulation 
providing “data useful for assessing tip compliance” but no tax attached for the failure 
to comply. 809 F.2d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The other regulations involved the 
assessment of tax and the employer could “refuse to comply, pay the statutory fine, 
and sue for a refund of the fine.” Id. at 843-45. But see California v. Regan, 641 F.2d 
721, 722 (9th Cir. 1981) (subjecting California’s reporting requirement pursuant to 
ERISA to the Declaratory Judgment Act). 
 354. See Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Treasury, 136 S. Ct. 2429, 2429 
(2016). 
 355. See generally Patrick J. Smith, D.C. Circuit in Florida Bankers 
Misapplies Anti-Injunction Act, 149 TAX NOTES 1493 (Dec. 21, 2015). 
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III. USE OF GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION 
Congress never expected that all agency materials would go 
through notice and comment. At the time that Congress created the 
procedure, it included exceptions. Although agencies often use these 
statutory exceptions, courts interpret them narrowly.356 As discussed 
below, courts interpret these exceptions so that notice and comment is 
the default but not required if other public goals of sufficient merit 
conflict with the process. One such exception is the good cause 
exception that permits agencies to skip notice and comment in limited 
circumstances.357 The Treasury Department often relies on good cause 
but fails to justify its reliance in a way that would create a strong 
argument for mitigating notice and comment. 
A. General Exception from Notice and Comment 
Agencies often chafe against the restraints of notice and 
comment.358 They argue that the procedures have become onerous and 
reduce the amount of rules and guidance that are produced because the 
production is costly in terms of agency time and resources.359 Perhaps 
anticipating this result, Congress enacted the good cause exception as 
one of several exceptions from notice and comment.360 At its heart, this 
exception works to balance “conflicting values,” and that balancing 
will always be fraught with political and social discontent.361 Although 
                                                   
 356. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 16, at 493-94. 
 357. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012). 
 358. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, The Perfect Process is the Enemy of the 
Good Tax: Tax’s Exceptional Regulatory Process, 35 VA. TAX REV. 553, 577-85 
(2016). 
 359. For more on ossification, see infra text at note 567. 
 360. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2012). Other exceptions are specific subject-
matter exceptions for national priority circumstances—military or foreign affairs—or 
for internal agency or government business. See § 553(a). Another exception is for 
interpretive or procedural rules and general statements of public policy. See § 
553(b)(A). These latter forms of guidance are not supposed to have the force and 
effect of law or, alternatively, do not govern substantive rights. Instead, they offer 
guidance as to the agency’s interpretation of the law. The ability to issue interpretive 
regulations has come into question and any distinction that remains between the types 
of rules—interpretive or legislative—is difficult for agencies to make. See, e.g., 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 
50, 61 (1995); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991). See also 
Lubbers, supra note 228, at 64-77; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17. See generally 
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Johnson, supra note 238. For this 
reason, interpretive guidance is left for other scholars to debate. 
 361. Jordan, supra note 266, at 116. 
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currently not widely accepted by courts, the good cause exception 
permits agencies to issue immediately binding guidance that has the 
force of law.362 This exception only applies to the extent that 
compliance with the notice-and-comment procedure is “impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”363 There is an 
additional good cause exception to the standard thirty-day waiting 
period following rules’ publication before they become effective.364 At 
times, these exceptions are a large “legal grey hole” through which 
agencies avoid judicial review of their procedure in making law.365  
Because of the good cause exception’s power to create law 
through a less public process than required by notice and comment, 
Congress and the courts limit its application.366 The goal is often to 
maintain a robust dialogue between agencies and the public except 
when the dialogue is not a net benefit to society. Thus, the good cause 
exception is not intended to be an escape clause but, instead, is 
conditioned upon a “true and supported or supportable finding of 
necessity or emergency . . . made and published.”367 The good cause 
test is only to apply “when ‘delay would do real harm’” to the public.368 
The difficulty, however, is that the terms “emergency” and “harm” are 
not defined.369 Parties may interpret them differently in the face of 
different facts.  
Good cause is defined in the APA as entailing one or more of 
three criteria: when compliance with notice and comment is 
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.370 Each 
                                                   
 362. For more on the government’s interpretation of the good cause exception, 
see generally JARED P. COLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R44356, THE GOOD CAUSE 
EXCEPTION TO NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY 
ACTION (2016). 
 363. Id. at 1. 
 364. § 553(d). See Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1485 
(9th Cir. 1992) (discussing conceptual differences between good cause exception to 
notice and comment and good cause exception to thirty-day requirement). 
 365. See Adrian Vermeule, supra note 30, at 1130. 
 366. See id. at 1123. 
 367. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 14. In the brief discussion on the congressional 
floor regarding the good cause exception when the APA was enacted, the presenting 
Representative commented that the good cause exception “may be made operative 
only where facts and interests are such that notice and proceedings are impossible or 
manifestly unnecessary.” 92 CONG. REC. 5650 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter). 
 368. San Diego Navy Broadway Complex Coal. v. U.S. Coast Guard, No. 
10cv2565-IEG(RBB), 2011 WL 1212888, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2011) (quoting 
Hawaii Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. FAA, 51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1995)) 
(accepting as good cause the depletion of Coast Guard resources). 
 369. See S. REP. NO. 79-752, at App. A. 
 370. See § 553(b)(B). There is also a good cause exception from the 30-day 
waiting period between a rule’s publication and effective date. See § 553(d)(3). 
568 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
category of reasoning for the good cause exception has a long and 
complicated judicial history in part because of courts’ perceptions that 
agencies exploit the exception in order to shorten the regulatory 
process.371 To win under courts’ narrow interpretation, agencies must 
“incorporate[] the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor.”372 
Thus, agencies must explain their reasoning contemporaneously. They 
need not explicitly invoke the exception, but the record must “manifest 
plainly the agency’s reliance on the exception.”373 Judges may deny 
the exception’s application if the agency’s reasoning is insufficiently 
developed.374 Yet courts have been inconsistent in their enforcement 
of this requirement to explain the underlying rationale for the claim.375  
First, the “unnecessary” prong of the good cause exception only 
applies if the rule is noncontroversial and “the public is not 
particularly interested” in it, such as a minor technical amendment.376 
If the new rule or rule change would be of consequence to members 
of the public, this prong should not apply. For example, when the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) erroneously did a “search 
and replace” in drafting a rule, an error resulted that was of great 
consequence to the public (the difference being fifty parts per million 
or ten parts per million), so notice and comment was necessary to 
remove the error.377 However, in limited circumstances, courts have 
interpreted “unnecessary” expansively, producing some confusion as 
to the appropriate standard.378  
Some agencies take a liberal reading of “unnecessary” when the 
public is given the opportunity to trigger notice and comment. With 
direct final rules, an agency publishes a notice claiming the exception 
                                                   
 371. See, e.g., Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 822 
F.2d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987) The “inquiry should be a close one” but not to be 
automatically dismissed because the inquiry is “inevitably fact- or context-
dependent.” Id. 
 372. § 553(b)(B). 
 373. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 768 
(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n v. United States, 
59 F.3d 1219, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).  
 374. See Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 375. See Juan Lavilla, The Good Cause Exception to Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 
317, 399-403 (1989). 
 376. See Attorney General Manual, supra note 203, at 31. A study conducted 
in the 1980s found that almost 25% of rules adopted pursuant to the good cause 
exception were grounded on the claim they were unnecessary as minor or technical. 
See also Lavilla, supra note 375, at 342 n.92. 
 377. See Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 752 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
 378. See Chlorine Inst., Inc. v. OSHA, 613 F.2d 120, 124 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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and the proposed adoption of a rule without public participation.379 If 
no member of the public submits an adverse comment within the 
period provided, often thirty days, the rule is adopted without notice 
and comment; however, if an adverse comment is received, the agency 
withdraws the rule and proceeds with notice and comment.380 
Although supported by the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, a nonpartisan independent agency, the validity of this 
procedure is debated.381 In the event that notice and comment is truly 
unnecessary, direct final rulemaking is more than the APA requires; if 
notice and comment applies, direct final rulemaking may be 
insufficient because it fails to strictly comply with the APA. Courts 
have not yet ruled on this issue. 
Second, the “impracticable” prong of the good cause exception 
applies if the use of notice and comment would thwart the agency’s 
“due and timely execution of its functions.”382 This expressly 
prioritizes the agency’s enabling act when the agency is unable to 
“follow section 553 and execute its statutory duties.”383 The Attorney 
General’s Manual, published in 1947 and interpreting the then newly 
enacted APA, illustrates impracticability as when an agency tasked 
with saving lives learned from the investigation of an airline incident 
that a rule should be revised immediately in order to save lives.384 In 
that case, notice and comment was impracticable because of the 
overriding need to ensure air safety.385 
What is sufficient evidence of impracticability is unclear. A 
statutory deadline for the completion of regulations does not, by itself, 
make the notice-and-comment procedure impracticable but may be 
evidence of it.386 Courts “are duty bound to analyze the entire set of 
circumstances” to determine whether there is sufficient time to permit 
                                                   
 379. For a discussion of direct final rulemaking, see Lars Noah, Doubts about 
Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 406-07 (1999); Ronald M. Levin, 
More on Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 758-63 (1999); Ronald M. 
Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995). 
 380. See Levin, supra note 379, at 1. 
 381. See generally Administrative Conference of the U.S. Recommendation 
95-4, Procedures for Noncontroversial and Expedited Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 
43110 (Aug. 18, 1995). 
 382. Attorney General Manual, supra note 203, at 30. 
 383. Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 184 (1st Cir. 1983).  
 384. See Attorney General Manual, supra note 203, at 30-31.  
 385. See id. 
 386. See Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1236-37 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Sepulveda v. Block, 782 F.2d 363, 366 (2d Cir. 1986); Petry v. 
Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1201-03 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Levesque, 723 F.2d at 184; U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979); U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 
F.2d 283, 287 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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notice and comment, including the resources the agency has available 
to create those regulations.387 The agency’s time pressure must result 
from a congressionally mandated deadline and not from the agency’s 
delay.388 This limitation is true even if the agency adopts the regulation 
after prolonged agency consideration that included a hearing and the 
submission of extensive pre- and post-hearing comments.389 
As with many things in the law, the content of the good cause 
exception when deadlines apply is unclear. In Consumers Union of the 
U.S., Inc. v. Sawhill, the court found one month and two days 
sufficient to hold notice and comment on the Federal Energy 
Administration’s interim price regulation for unleaded gasoline, in 
part on the grounds that the agency could have shortened the comment 
period from the traditional thirty days.390 On the other hand, in 
Philadelphia Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, a forty-nine-day window 
before a law was effective was sufficiently short to allow waiver of 
notice and comment on a regulation governing a reduction in Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (a precursor to Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF).391 Deadlines do not always 
have to be explicit as long as the “congressional intent is stated” or 
even “otherwise revealed that implementation of the statue should be 
speedy.”392 
The legislation’s complexity and severity of results are 
important factors in determining whether Congress has made notice 
and comment impracticable. When the Secretary “faced the daunting 
task of preparing regulations to implement a complete and radical 
overhaul of the Medicare reimbursement system,” the court found 
                                                   
 387. See Petry, 737 F.2d at 1202-03. 
 388. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 
2006); see also NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 206 (2d Cir. 2004); Am. Fed’n of 
Gov’t Emps. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Council of S. 
Mountains, Inc., 653 F.2d 573, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981); New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 
1038, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1980); N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 2d. 7, 
15-16 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 389. See Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 
1322 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014). 
 390. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Sawhill, 393 F. Supp. 639, 641 
(D.C. Cir. 1975). Some courts object to shorter periods. For example, in Energy 
Reserves Grp. v. FEA, the court held a fifteen-day comment period was too short. 447 
F. Supp. 1135, 1139 ,1151 (D. Kan. 1978). 
 391. See Phila. Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 885 (3d Cir. 
1982). See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 
95 Stat. 357. 
 392. See Lavilla, supra note 375, at 357. See also Phila. Citizens in Action, 
669 F.2d at 885; Coal. of Mich. Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 537 F. Supp. 451, 
456 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
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good cause to not apply notice and comment.393 A district court also 
upheld the Department of Homeland Security and Department of 
Labor’s use of the good cause exception for regulations, without 
which temporary non-agricultural workers could not be granted 
visas.394 Thus, a deadline required by the statute or exigent 
circumstances, coupled with other factors, make it more likely courts 
will accept a claim for the good cause exception.  
However, courts may be reluctant to recognize federal financial 
considerations as justifying a good cause exception even when in 
conjunction with short timeframes. For example, in Levesque v. Block, 
the First Circuit would not uphold an interim rule despite proof of a 
significant financial consequence.395 The Department of Agriculture 
published interim rules governing food stamp regulations on 
September 4, 1981, to be implemented by the states by October 1, 
1981, the beginning of the new fiscal year. The comment period 
opened on September 4 for 120 days and final rules were promulgated 
on November 19, 1982, more than a year after states were to comply.396  
In Levesque, the Department argued that it had good cause to 
defer notice and comment largely on the basis that the regulations, by 
operationalizing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 
would save $1 billion.397 The agency estimated the notice-and-
comment procedure would have taken three months, which would 
have pushed the regulations beyond the start of the new fiscal year and 
delayed the cost savings by the year. Moreover, the budget for the food 
stamp program had assumed these savings so that benefits for 
everyone would have to be cut if the savings were not achieved.398 In 
the Act, Congress had granted the Secretary the power to implement 
the new rules wholly according to the Secretary’s discretion, only 
taking into account the need for “orderly implementation.”399 The First 
Circuit interpreted “orderly” as not requiring “immediate 
implementation” or speedy action.400 
                                                   
 393. Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
 394. See Bayou Lawn & Landscape Servs. v. Johnson, 173 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 
1272 (N.D. Fla. 2016); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Devine, 671 F.2d 607, 
613 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 395. See Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 184 (1st Cir. 1983). Food stamp 
regulations are required to be issued in accordance with notice and comment despite 
being a benefit program. See also 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1982); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). 
 396. See Levesque, 723 F.2d at 178. 
 397. See id. 
 398. See id. 
 399. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (1982). 
 400. See Levesque, 723 F.2d at 185. 
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More recently, in Sorenson Communications Inc. v. FCC, the 
D.C. Circuit Court would not accept the possibility of the agency’s 
potential budget shortage as providing good cause.401 The Federal 
Communications Commissioner promulgated rules imposing 
certification requirements on hearing-impaired individuals receiving 
telephones with captioning capability. The rules were adopted because 
the plaintiff distributed free captioning-enabled phones, which greatly 
increased demand for captioned services subsidized by a government-
organized fund.402 The concern was that the pre-regulation pace of 
spending would deplete the fund before the end of the year. Although 
the D.C. Circuit would “not exclude the possibility that a fiscal 
calamity could conceivably justify bypassing the notice-and-comment 
requirement,” it found the record was “simply too scant to establish a 
fiscal emergency.”403  
Thus, courts have held that deadlines can make notice and 
comment impracticable for the creation of necessary guidance; 
however, many courts are reluctant to accept short time frames alone 
as such a justification. Reluctance is particularly strong if there is the 
perception that the agency created the time pressure. Other factors 
often need to strengthen the justification, and financial considerations 
are unlikely to qualify as a factor. Financial considerations are 
disfavored as the purpose of the APA is to protect rights.404  
The final, and most opaquely defined, prong of the good cause 
exception applies when notice and comment is “contrary to the public 
interest,” meaning that the procedure would defeat the public’s 
interests, however that is defined.405 Often used in conjunction with 
the impracticability prong, courts generally require some form of 
emergency, such as a threat to public health or safety.406 Courts have 
used this prong to permit rules providing for the automatic suspension 
of pilot licenses upon notification that the pilot is a security risk or for 
hunting regulations where the season had begun and the herds could 
dwindle to extinction.407 In the case of the pilots, the court permitted 
the regulations because the agency “deemed such regulations 
                                                   
 401. Sorenson Commc’ns. Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
see also Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 156 F. Supp. 3d 123 
(D.D.C. 2015) (failing to prove that high-tech employers needed to retain skilled 
technical workers to forestall a “fiscal emergency”). 
 402. See Sorenson, 755 F.3d at 705. 
 403. See id. at at 707. 
 404. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 250; S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 193. 
 405. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 203, at 30. 
 406. See Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
 407. See id. at 1179-80; N. Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741, 751 (10th 
Cir. 1987). 
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necessary” to minimize a threat, bestowing significant power on the 
agency.408 This was not surprising as the case arose shortly after 9/11. 
An emergency for this purpose does not have to be life or death. 
For example, in Mid-Tex Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC, the court 
permitted the use of the good cause exception.409 The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission issued a rule allowing electric utilities to 
include in their rate base a portion of the construction costs for 
ongoing projects, citing three factors: First, the rule was temporary 
and limited in scope; second, the public had a lengthy opportunity to 
comment on virtually the same rule in a prior rule; third, there was a 
concern that the lack of the rule would cause “regulatory confusion” 
and “irremedia[ble] financial consequences” because of reliance.410 
Combining those factors, the court found the rule to be in the public 
interest.411 
Financial considerations play a part in public-interest cases, 
often because of the concern that the prior announcement of 
regulations has a negative economic effect but only if the effect is 
adequately proven.412 For example, a court upheld an executive order 
preventing the increase of professional football season ticket prices 
despite the order not having gone through notice and comment 
because of a concern that prior notice would lead to anticipatory price 
increases.413 However, the agency must be prepared to demonstrate to 
a reviewing court the substantiality of its fear that regulated parties 
would undermine the contemplated regulation while the regulation is 
pending.414 For example, in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company v. 
FERC, the D.C. Circuit refused to apply the good cause exception to 
a rule requiring advanced notice of the construction of natural gas 
pipeline facilities because the court was not persuaded that businesses 
would rapidly build facilities to avoid an unknown rule.415 Therefore, 
                                                   
 408. Jifry, 370 F.3d at 1179. 
 409. See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 822 
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the court was unable to determine whether the agency’s prediction was 
reasonable and so it vacated the regulations.416 
The claim to the public interest is contentious, as seen in the 
Circuit Court split over non-tax regulations issued under the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act of 2006.417 The regulations 
require sex offenders traveling interstate to register in the various 
states.418 These regulations apply retroactively to those convicted as a 
sex offender before the Act was signed.419 They were issued without 
notice and comment on the grounds that they were necessary to 
eliminate uncertainty and to prevent delay in registration by those who 
would evade registration during notice and comment, commit 
additional sexual assaults, and be harder to apprehend.420 The 
Fourth,421 Fifth,422 and Eleventh423 Circuits have upheld the regulations; 
the Third,424 Sixth,425 Eighth,426 and Ninth Circuits427 have vacated the 
regulations on the grounds that they are procedurally invalid. 
Arguing impracticability or that notice and comment is contrary 
to the public interest, agencies sometimes adopt rules as interim-final 
rules for which the public is invited to submit comments after the rule 
becomes effective.428 This procedure makes the rule final and proposed 
at the same time, although in a different process than issuing both 
temporary and proposed regulations.429 With interim-final rules, the 
agency commits itself to consider any submitted comments and 
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modify the rule if warranted. The agency’s open-mindedness in that 
consideration is a relevant factor in determining whether good cause 
existed in the first place.430 This process is valid under the APA if there 
is a good cause justification, in which case the subsequent comment 
period is good practice but statutorily unnecessary. 
Because of the uncertainty over the meaning of “unnecessary,” 
“impracticable,” and “contrary to the public interest,” Congress has 
considered a number of amendments to the phrasing of the good cause 
exception since the APA’s enactment in 1946.431 None have been 
enacted. Many proposals would restrict the exception’s use to issues 
of public health, safety, or welfare, although most maintain an 
“important public interest” or “legislative policies” components.432 
Proposed changes would generally limit the exception’s availability 
or increase the cost of relying on the exception.433 For example, a bill 
introduced in the 114th Congress would expand the subsequent 
comment period and provide for hearings when rules are excepted 
because notice and comment is impracticable or contrary to the public 
interest.434 When the Administrative Conference of the United States 
made a similar proposal, it noted that the reasonableness of the 
comment period should take “into account the nature and number of 
comments and the agency’s other responsibilities.”435 Exactly how this 
would affect the issuance of guidance remains unknown. 
B. Use of the Good Cause Exception in Tax 
As discussed in Part II, tax is an essential part of the federal 
budget. The budgeting system generally assumes that tax provisions’ 
estimated revenue is raised despite any need for agency action to 
implement the law or to limit statutory ambiguities to preserve that 
revenue. This link between the revenue raised and revenue spent 
evidences the Treasury Department’s need to speedily adopt operating 
rules and justifies a good cause exception from notice and comment. 
Because of the assumption that most tax provisions are immediately 
effective and their revenue is built into the budgeting process, 
Congress implicitly demands quick (generally before the end of the 
fiscal year) issuance of implementing rules.  
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Fundamental to this justification is the recognition that tax 
revenue is necessary for the government to fund all other federal 
projects and is a unique part of the political bargain creating those 
projects. Congress decides as between projects based, in part, on the 
amount of revenue available to fund them, often with projects reduced 
in scope to fit within revenue estimates. Therefore, delay in the 
operation of the tax law frustrates congressional objectives and 
destroys the political bargain implicit in the budgeting process with a 
spillover effect on the financial basis of other federal projects436 Even 
with older provisions, current year budgetary consequences demand 
implementation of a workable regime. The budget is built on a 
baseline of historical legislation, and subsequent changes presuppose 
the effectiveness of earlier tax legislation.437 
This pressure imposed by revenue expectations exists even when 
Congress does not specifically call for agency action or explicitly 
provide when tax regulations or IRS materials must be issued. Instead, 
Congress builds into tax legislation an expectation that the system will 
operate on taxpayers by an effective date, often the following tax year.  
For example, many tax provisions, such as the $10,000 limit on 
the deduction for state and local taxes imposed by the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act, need explication to ensure taxpayers do not circumvent the 
law and frustrate its revenue-raising potential.438 States responded to 
the enactment by adopting measures to allow their taxpayers to make 
deductible charitable contributions instead of paying non-deductible 
taxes.439 Permitting this circumvention of the new limit would 
jeopardize some portion of the $668.4 billion in revenue Congress 
expected this provision (along with changes to a host of other 
deductions) to raise.440 The Treasury Department responded with a 
notice detailing plans to propose regulations that will be “informed by 
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substance-over-form principles.”441 The agency’s goal is likely to 
reduce this form of tax planning, but the notice itself does not provide 
the principles to distinguish programs; those principles will only come 
in the form of regulations. Drafted to survive scrutiny under notice and 
comment, it is unlikely any new regulations could be ready by the end 
of the tax-filing season.  
When agencies do not explicate the law, it is harder for the 
government to win in court. Without interpretation, ambiguities may 
be interpreted in the taxpayer’s favor. In one 2018 case, the Tax Court 
sided with the taxpayer “for mistakes of law in a complicated subject 
area that lacks clear guidance.”442 Although tax law does not default in 
favor of either the government or the taxpayer, the practical result may 
be judicial frustration with the lack of government action. Moreover, 
the government has the opportunity to craft a clearer meaning 
consistent with its revenue needs if the agency has the ability to issue 
regulations and other guidance.  
It is tax’s core role in budgeting that makes retroactive guidance, 
permissible under the Internal Revenue Code in many instances, an 
insufficient fix.443 Although Congress expressly grants the Treasury 
Department the ability to issue retroactive regulations in limited 
circumstances, doing so raises issues of fairness because guidance 
affects closed transactions, one reason this power is unusual.444 
Furthermore, retroactivity disturbs the desired certainty of the tax 
system. With retroactivity, taxpayers have no assurance which rules 
will apply when they file their tax returns. Instead, taxpayers must 
guess whether the rules will change.  
This proof of congressional intent to create an operative, 
prospective tax system is at least as strong as previously used to find 
good cause. Good cause was found from a statutory effective date 
being “close” to the enactment date and from a “strong congressional 
intent to expedite . . . implementation” because enactment and 
effective dates were identical when a Senate report also showed 
dissatisfaction with the slow implementation of rules the year 
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before.445 With tax’s implicit deadline, requiring that guidance go 
through notice and comment is impracticable and contrary to the 
public’s interest.  
The claim to impracticability and public interest is strengthened 
because, like Medicare, tax law is complex.446 With many revisions of 
the tax system occurring on an annual basis, some demanding 
significant agency attention, such as the rules in the Affordable Care 
Act or the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the Treasury Department cannot 
create timely guidance on all legislative changes through notice and 
comment. It is not that one piece of guidance must be created but that 
many are necessary. Their cumulative need is to create a reasonably 
operative budget system, without which “fiscal calamity” for the 
nation is all but certain.447  
Although protecting the government’s purse could be seen as 
insufficient to justify reducing procedural rights, the nation’s 
economic health is sufficiently important to justify a good cause 
exception from notice and comment. Courts, which have dispensed 
with notice and comment because of a gasoline shortage, should 
recognize that the national budget and the federal government’s long-
term financial health are equally important.448 Similarly, courts have 
permitted the use of the good cause exception to create rules to 
authorize the sale of homes because of the government’s high cost of 
retaining unsuitable homes and to maintain the financial stability of 
federal employee health plan carriers, highway funding, and the 
efficient use of navigable airspace.449 These concerns are no greater 
than the nation’s budgetary health. 
Therefore, the good cause exception from notice and comment 
should be available under its prongs of “impracticability” and 
“contrary to the public interest” any time Congress incorporates 
revenue estimates for tax legislation into the budget. Although many 
courts prefer Congress to explicitly state that notice and comment can 
be disregarded, Congress does not have to express its intent for the 
                                                   
 445. Sepulveda v. Block, 782 F.2d 363, 366 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Williams 
v. Pierce, 708 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 446. See Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1237 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
 447. See Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F3d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 448. See Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455, 458-59 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1974). 
 449. See Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Devine, 671 F.2d 607, 611-12 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Valiant Steel & Equip., Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 499 F. Supp. 410, 412 n.5 (D.D.C. 1980); 
Arteaga v. Lyng, 660 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (M.D. Fla. 1987). 
 Tax as Part of a Broken Budget 579 
exception to be meritorious. 450 That a tension exists between the 
structural imperative Congress has created and courts’ desire to limit 
the exception does not negate the need for the exception.  
The sheer number of changes to the tax system enacted annually 
strengthens this Article’s proposed argument. For example, in 2017, 
well over 100 tax provisions were adopted or revised, many of which 
have been recognized as complex or seemingly contradictory.451 Those 
changes necessitate the speedy adoption of many, often detailed and 
complex regulations. Without the good cause exception to notice and 
comment, meeting Congress’s revenue expectations is likely 
impossible because of the compounding effect of numerous new tax 
statutes and changes to existing tax provisions.  
The justification is further strengthened by a consideration of all 
of the tasks assigned to the Treasury Department. When courts 
evaluate the practicability of a procedure, they do so not in a vacuum 
but after considering the totality of the agency’s circumstance.452 In its 
recent plea for funding, the Treasury Department illustrated the 
diversity of its tasks as ranging from helping developing nations 
reduce carbon pollution to curbing terrorist financing to 
cybersecurity.453 The myriad tasks impose a financial constraint on 
how all tasks are accomplished because Congress does not prioritize 
them. 
Although funding complaints are undoubtedly common 
throughout the government, this does not negate problems created by 
the lack of staffing and funding for those who draft and review 
regulations and other materials, the complaint often being that “being 
‘cheap’ at the front end results in much more cost at the back end.”454 
One study found that the issuance of guidance is “quite sensitive to the 
bureaucratic costs of adopting [it].”455 The number of published 
revenue rulings declined between 1974 and 1984 by 70% because the 
IRS and Treasury Department recognized that the process is costly and 
needed to divert guidance personnel to higher urgency tasks and the 
review process created delays and bottlenecks.456 Thus, the cost of 
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issuing guidance is a constraint. For example, the IRS restricts the 
issuance of one type of private guidance, private letter rulings, in order 
to conserve agency resources.457 
This cost is heightened by a current executive policy against the 
promulgation of regulations and other agency rules. In a desire to 
reduce regulation, President Donald Trump requires that executive 
agencies eliminate two rules every time they create a new one.458 That 
limitation does not consider the type of regulation being made or 
eliminated. In the face of institutional opposition, the political cost of 
creating regulations and other guidance interpreting the law is 
increased. That increase is despite Congress failing to simplify the law 
or draft laws less in need of guidance. 
In the face of its limited resources and diverse demands, to 
comply with notice and comment, the Treasury Department must 
divert resources to the creation of materials explicating the law 
(without increasing the amount of explication) from other, also 
congressionally mandated tasks. To the extent that courts are willing 
to consider the agency’s workload and staffing problems when 
evaluating justification for good cause, the Department’s diverse and 
pressing tasks should speak to how feasible the notice-and-comment 
process is for the myriad of tax provisions Congress enacts.459 
Permitting the use of the good cause exception also restores to 
the agency the power to shape the implementation of the law and takes 
the power from courts. The Supreme Court has held that agencies, 
rather than courts, should determine the procedures that are best for 
making the substantive judgments Congress requires.460 According to 
the Court, agencies’ expertise puts them “in a better position than 
federal courts or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to 
the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency 
involved.”461 This is what would occur if courts recognize a good cause 
exception to notice and comment for tax guidance.  
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This argument differs from that proposed by the IRS in the 
Internal Revenue Manual. In a section last updated in 2011, the IRS 
concluded: 
The following considerations may support the conclusion that good cause 
exists: 
• The need to avoid confusion,  
• The complexity of the regulatory frameworks addressed by the 
regulation,  
• Congressional authorization for the issuance of the rule, 
• The temporary or interim effect of the rule during which the agency 
devises a final rule incorporating notice and comment, and  
• Agency diligence in seeking notice and comment and promulgating 
a final rule incorporating those comments in accordance with the 
APA.462 
This list of considerations is overly broad even as it fails to mention 
the most valid reason for prompt issuance: to raise revenue for the 
federal government. As notice and comment necessarily slows the 
production of implementing guidance, it thwarts the agency’s ability 
to comply with the government’s budgeting expectations upon which 
congressional choices were based. 
Courts reluctant to embrace this interpretation of the good cause 
exception could start by limiting its application to regulations that are 
clearly targeted to raising revenue. With this limitation, the good cause 
exception would not apply to the issuance of regulations addressing 
procedural issues or that facilitate federal revenue reduction. 
Regulations covering these topics would be required to complete 
notice and comment unless another exception applies. Moreover, the 
justification would not reduce the thirty-day notice before regulations 
become effective unless the legislation was enacted so late in the year 
that it is impossible to satisfy this requirement before the end of the 
taxable year for most taxpayers.  
However, because tax preferences are not unlimited, the good 
cause exception should also apply to tax provisions that reduce 
government revenue. The Treasury Department needs to define 
provisions’ limits, which justifies the prompt issuance of tax materials. 
For example, in 2017, Congress enacted a limited “qualified business 
income” deduction.463 This deduction is extremely complex, limiting 
the percentage that can be deducted, by whom, and the types of income 
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that are qualified. Taxpayers’ economic incentive to claim the 
deduction is great as it may reduce the tax rate on certain income from 
37% to 29.6%.464 Thus, the incentives for taxpayers to try to figure the 
deduction out for themselves is great, especially in a manner that is 
more taxpayer-friendly than Congress intended. However, not only is 
the law complicated, but the new law provides a 20% penalty if 
taxpayers make more than a 5% error in claiming this deduction.465 
This penalty and the government’s need to contain the loss of revenue 
justify the prompt issuance of regulations and other materials. 
The alternative to accepting this argument regarding the good 
cause exception is the general requirement of notice-and-comment 
procedures coupled with hard-look review, which may result in the 
ossification of tax rulemaking.466 Ossification occurs because the 
procedural constraints imposed on federal agencies make the process 
so burdensome that agencies delay or defer issuing guidance.467 In the 
seventy years since the APA was adopted, many agencies have learned 
that it may take years to process comments and that pre-notice 
rulemaking may take twice as long because of the risk of judicial 
invalidation if a final regulation is not in essentially the same form as 
the proposed rule.468 There is no reason to think that the Treasury 
Department would be unusually fast in this process. Thus, without the 
exception, materials may simply not be published, or be significantly 
delayed, for internal or external consumption. 
This delay in the production of regulations and other materials, 
condoned by the President and tacitly supported by those urging notice 
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and comment, exacerbate current regulatory deficiencies.469 Not every 
tax provision that requires regulations has them issued, even with a 
congressional mandate to do so.470 Time and resource allocations as 
well as political pressures mean some tax provisions are never made 
fully operative.471 Projects may “linger or die” when Treasury 
Department personnel or the project’s politicization change.472 This 
failure damages the reputation of the agency and enforcement of the 
law. Courts may compel the creation of regulations but, with limited 
agency resources, only so much can practically be done.473 
In the form envisioned in this Article, the good cause exception 
is not expanded from broader APA jurisprudence and would not lead 
to a parade of horribles. The same limitations currently applied to the 
exception would continue to apply. Moreover, the tax system has 
built-in correctives that check abuse from continuing existing 
procedure. First, tax is a topic of rigorous public review.474 Politicians 
are aware that they can win political points by pointing out IRS abuse 
of power, real or imagined. Additionally, Congress’s budgetary 
demands ensure that members of Congress keep an eye on tax—even 
if not with the results that tax professors or the public always prefer. 
This political control over the tax system provides an avenue for 
public input at least as effective as notice and comment as it empowers 
Congress vis-à-vis the executive agency.475 Moreover, more than 95% 
                                                   
 469. See Michael Livermore & Richard Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, 
and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340, 1341 (2013). 
 470. See id. at 1341. When Congress delegates specific authority to the 
Treasury Department to issue regulations but regulations are not forthcoming, courts 
may invoke phantom regulations as though some form of regulation had been issued 
in order to apply the law. But see, e.g., Temsco Helicopters, Inc. v. United States, 409 
Fed. Appx. 64, 67 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Francisco v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 317, 322 
(T.C. 2002), aff’d, 370 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hillman v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 103, 
106, 114 (T.C. 2000), rev.’d on other grounds, 263 F.3d 338 (2001); Estate of 
Neumann v. Comm’r, 106 T.C. 216, 220 (T.C. 1996).  
 471. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 470, at 1381. 
 472. Jackel, supra note 192, at 935. 
 473. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 
U.S. 55, 65 (2004). But see Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 
77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 474. This is evidenced by the attention given to the enactment of the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act 2017 and the position of several political and tax specific blogs. See, 
e.g., Leandra Lederman, IRS Reform: Politics as Usual?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 36, 58 
(2016). 
 475. Professor Lisa Bressman notes that courts have interpreted administrative 
law to assist Congress “in monitoring agency action” because agencies are subject to 
“two political principals,” Congress and the President, and Congress might lose 
control of the law because of presidential power over the agency. Id. at 1752-53. This 
concern is less valid in taxation because there is significant congressional oversight. 
584 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
of U.S. federal trial-level tax litigation occurs in the U.S. Tax Court.476 
As a specialized court, the Tax Court is an expert in tax. Thus, 
watchdogs observe the government’s actions to limit abusive rules. 
Finally, there remain financial limits on the Treasury 
Department’s actions and a review of the substance of tax agencies’ 
materials. The cost of issuing any form of guidance as well as fear for 
its budget should deter the Treasury Department from unjustly altering 
rules simply because of a permissive process.477 The likelihood of a 
legislative response and judicial review of materials’ substance should 
minimize oscillation in policy and acts as a check on the final rule. 
These feedback loops already exist, ensuring that agency abuse in this 
area is unlikely. If abuse arises, Congress retains the power to threaten 
the agency’s budget or to increase the process required for issuing 
future materials. Until Congress chooses to do the latter, the good 
cause exception should be read consistently with its purpose and 
political reality. 
With these existing checks on agency power, permitting the 
Treasury Department and IRS to claim the good cause exception does 
not give undue power to the agencies but prioritizes the revenue needs 
set by Congress. When Congress speedily passes changes to tax laws, 
through reconciliation or other budgetary rules, Congress has 
established the statutory framework, and that speed must be carried 
over into the regulatory realm in order for the law, as enacted—even 
if imperfect—to work. Changes to this result should focus on 
Congress and how it passes laws, rather than using regulatory 
procedure to nullify the laws once enacted.478 Using notice and 
comment to alter the law upsets the constitutional balance of power.479  
CONCLUSION 
Drafting the federal budget, deficit spending, and adding to the 
national debt all follow rules that limit the government’s ability to 
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spend money without raising offsetting revenue. These rules exist 
because the American public is concerned about federal spending. 
Today, these rules risk being subordinated to the APA’s procedural 
formalism in notice and comment. That subordination may be 
inadvertent and occur without a thoughtful discussion of the cost of 
this formalism. This is problematic because, although the federal 
budget generally assumes that tax statutes are operational when they 
are enacted, tax laws rarely operate well without some form of agency 
guidance.  
When courts accept the good cause exception in the tax context, 
the federal budget’s revenue becomes more secure and budgeting 
requirements can be met. Adding procedural delay to current political 
resistance to raise taxes threatens the budgeting system and makes it 
more likely that Congress creates a budget with faulty information 
about the law’s effectiveness. Thus, ignoring the availability of the 
good cause exception risks increasing the national debt without 
Congress’s or the public’s awareness of tax law changes’ impact on 
national debt until years after law is enacted. Accountability for these 
choices is maximized when agency guidance is quickly made 
available to the public.  
Courts are not the only fix for this problem of administrative 
procedure trumping budgeting rules. Congress could legislate a tax 
exclusion to the APA or alter its taxing and spending choices. With 
the latter, Congress would change the financial dynamics of many 
proposals before it; and changing those dynamics could alter the fate 
of the proposals, even for proposals that are not directly tax-related. 
Consequently, both sides of the ledger, taxing and spending, may be 
affected by the failure to accept the need for speedy tax materials. 
Despite Congress’s power, courts need not wait for Congress to 
expressly alter APA rules. The good cause exception exists as a 
backstop to the APA. In this instance, the American budget coupled 
with complicated congressional politics demands use of the exception. 
This interpretation is consistent with the current jurisprudence on the 
exception. 
Permitting this use of the good cause exception will not make all 
future tax materials perfect; however, it recognizes that strict 
adherence to the notice-and-comment process does not address most 
concerns about that materials’ value. At one high-level roundtable 
talk, the complaint was not the lack of notice and comment in the 
making of tax rules, but instead the Treasury Department and IRS’s 
fear of “getting it wrong” and therefore delaying guidance.480 This 
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problem of a lack of guidance would be exacerbated if notice and 
comment were required in all instances. Without the freedom to issue 
clarifying materials in response to rapidly changing tax law, the nation 
will fail its budgetary obligations.481 
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